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The international tax problems of today are typically beyond the scope of a single nation to solve. 
However, the prospect of multinational problem solving, often under the auspices of an international 
organization, unleashes objections grounded in sovereignty.  Despite widespread reliance on sovereignty 
arguments, little attention has been directed at what precisely is meant by sovereignty and what place it has 
in international tax policy.  This article contends that a loss of sovereignty undermines both significant 
functional roles played by a nation-state (revenue and fiscal policy) and important normative governance 
values (accountability and democratic legitimacy).  Whether these limitations are severe enough to demand 
that a sovereign state recall its taxing powers from an international body (or not surrender them initially) 
depends on the nature of the powers in question and the necessity for a coordinated global response. 
Part I develops the basic nexus between sovereignty and taxation.  Part II examines the use of 
sovereignty in the debates and analyses surrounding three international tax case studies.  Drawing upon the 
case studies, Part III considers how sovereignty claims are manipulated in tax debates, how states think 
about sovereignty in taxation, and what their decisions, in turn, suggest about the future of international tax 





No significant issue in international tax can be discussed without raising the 
question of “sovereignty.”  Does a particular outcome or position harm or infringe upon a 
nation’s sovereignty?  Is sovereignty advanced by the proposed tax plan?  Should a 
sovereign nation participate in multilateral tax cooperation to solve shared problems? The 
larger question, however, is what exactly is meant by sovereignty and what is at stake as 
we think about the place of sovereignty in international tax.   
Why does sovereignty matter?  Sovereignty takes center stage in international tax 
because much of the debate over both rules and policies involves and impacts other 
nations.  As is widely recognized, nations do not act in a vacuum in conducting 
international tax policy.1  Even purely domestic actions can have significant 
ramifications abroad.2  Moreover, much effective tax policy implementation requires the 
interaction, even cooperation, of two or more nations.  Almost a century of bilateral tax 
treaties3 evidences the longstanding need for something more than unilateral action in 
solving international tax problems. Often efforts have proceeded on a multilateral scale.  
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) itself has served 
                                                 
1 The observation that domestic tax legislation on matters of cross border taxation does not exist in a 
vacuum does not imply that such legislation and policy is carefully coordinated with the rules of other 
countries.   
2 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 26-27 (1995) (pervasive 
nature of interdependence among states); Alan James, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 177-79 (1986) (impact of 
interdependence in understanding sovereignty). 
3 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, “The Original Intent of U.S. International Taxation,” 
46 DUKE L. J.1021, 1066-1089 (1997) (describing the historical development of tax treaties); Michael J. 
Graetz, “Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory 
Policies,” 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1357, 1395-1397 (history and growth of tax treaties). 
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as a primary forum for coordination of international tax through its model treaty and 
commentary, its reports and position papers, and its discussion opportunities.  The 
OECD, however, does not have any binding force on nations and cannot dictate tax 
treatment.  In the context of the European Union (EU), the potential for more binding 
uniform tax treatment across nations is possible; however, the progress to date on that 
front has been rather limited.4
In the midst of all of this multilateral discussion, the constant refrain of 
“sovereignty” can be heard, both explicitly and implicitly.  Reference to sovereignty is 
used widely and varyingly – often with a broad rhetorical flourish.  While this usage is 
not unique to taxation,5 there is a particular strength to the claims for tax sovereignty and 
the assertion of tax’s special status.6  Despite widespread reliance on sovereignty 
arguments, little attention has been directed at what precisely is meant by sovereignty and 
what place it has in international tax policy.  What is at stake as we decide what role 
sovereignty should play in international tax?  This article contends that significant 
functional roles of government and certain normative values can be undermined through 
a loss of tax sovereignty.  Although this conclusion does not provide a definitive 
benchmark for decisions on tax cooperation, it does provide a caution against arguments 
that sovereignty is not significant and does point to elements that can make cooperative 
efforts more legitimate.   
Part I develops the basic nexus between sovereignty and taxation by: (1) outlining 
the central concepts of sovereignty as they have developed in international relations 
(“IR”) theory; (2) mapping the functional relationship between sovereignty and taxation; 
and (3) considering the core norms at stake in the debate over sovereignty in international 
tax.  Part II examines the use of sovereignty in the discussions and analyses surrounding 
three international tax case studies.  Reliance on the concept of sovereignty appears 
across many nations and in many contexts.  Elected officials, policy makers, 
commentators, scholars, and tax protestors all lay claim to “sovereignty” – whether as a 
critique, an explanation, or an assessment.  Not surprisingly, this widespread use of the 
term is accompanied by variation in meaning and function that must be parsed before any 
consideration of sovereignty’s role.   
Drawing upon the three case studies, Part III considers the how sovereignty 
claims are manipulated in tax debates, how states think about sovereignty in taxation, and 
what their decisions, in turn, suggest about the future of international tax.  As nations 
decide whether to tackle some of the more challenging problems of international tax 
today, such as tax competition and tax arbitrage – which demand more than a unilateral 
                                                 
4 See infra text accompanying notes ___. 
5 See, e.g., Michael Ross Fowler & Julie Marie Bunck, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE 23 (1995) 
(“Many politicians and diplomats use the substantial rhetorical power of the term [sovereignty] to provide 
additional force to their country’s  diplomatic position or to express outrage at some injustice their people 
may have suffered.  Leaders claim, perhaps with increasing frequency, that their country’s sovereign rights 
are being trampled by an interested power, an international organization, a multinational company, a 
meddlesome neighbor, or some real or imagined aggressor.); Alan James, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 1-2 
(1986) (describing rhetorical references to sovereignty in legal and political discourse at an international 
and domestic level). 
6 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, “An International Tax Regime in Crystallization,” 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 283 
(2003) (“Tax rates are the most fiercely defended component of each country’s tax system.”).  Rules 
governing tax legislation and voting requirements in the European Union are indicative of the unique status 
acknowledged for tax law and policy.  See infra Part II.B. 
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response to achieve an impact7 – sovereignty will maintain a prominent place in the 
discussion.  At a minimum, we can see that assertions of tax sovereignty reflect the more 
modern conception of the sovereign state.  As “sovereignty” has transformed to mean a 
state with responsibility for its people, the question of a state’s legitimacy now requires 
satisfaction of this duty.  A state will need revenue to achieve these sovereign goals.  
Thus, protection of the revenue source (taxes) and, correspondingly, the state’s taxing 
powers, become crucial to the state’s duty to its people.  The exercise of these taxing 
powers can put a state in direct conflict with other states also exercising this basic 
sovereign right.  Alternatively, a state might find that it requires the assistance or 
cooperation of other states to achieve its desired tax policy – although the very act of 
cooperation might paradoxically jeopardize its own sovereignty.  Such is the challenge of 
tax sovereignty for the modern state. 
The three case studies illustrate the use of sovereignty in three different stages of 
multistate tax cooperation.  The first captures the state-to-state conflict of two nations (or 
groups of nations) in direct conflict over the exercise of their taxing powers.  The second 
reflects the tension and debate surrounding a decision to surrender taxing power to an 
international body.  The third depicts the conflict between a nation and an international 
organization to which it already has ceded certain taxing powers.  The context in which 
sovereignty is asserted changes but the problems remain the same because of the 
democratic state’s underlying obligations to its citizens and the potential risk posed by a 
loss of tax sovereignty. 
 
 
I.   THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
 
This part begins by providing a background understanding of sovereignty as it has 
developed in IR theory and then by detailing the primary operational links between 
sovereignty and taxation.  With this connection between the two, we can then examine 
why sovereignty is central to four key normative concepts: democratic accountability, 
democratic legitimacy, local control/multiple sovereigns, and the competing exercises of 
sovereign power. 
 
A. THE SOVEREIGNTY CONCEPT 
The topic of sovereignty -- its meaning and use over time -- has been the subject 
of extensive analysis in IR literature.8  No single definition of sovereignty prevails. The 
                                                 
7 See Reuven Avi-Yonah , “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,” 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 passim (2000); OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL 
ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter OECD TAX COMPETITION REPORT]; and Diane M. Ring, “One Nation Among 
Many: Policy Implication of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage,” 44 B.C.L. REV. 79,168-69 (2002).  
8 The “modern” vision of sovereignty emerged in the 1500s: “The concept of exclusive control within a 
delineated geographic area and the untrammeled right to self-help internationally, which emerged out of 
late medieval Europe, have come to pervade the modern legal system.”  Stephen D. Krasner, Structural 
Causes and Regime Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 17-18 (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983) 
[hereinafter Structural Causes]; Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 21 (“Popular references to the term 
sovereignty may be traced to . . . the late sixteenth century.”); Hendrik Spruyt, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND 
ITS COMPETITORS 27 (1994) (explaining that his case studies of European state formation “ends about the 
time of the Peace of Westphalia  (1648), which formally acknowledged  a system of sovereign states.”).   
Certainly predecessors of this vision developed in the Roman Empire (and elsewhere) but then receded 
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meaning changes over the centuries and across contexts.  Moreover, the meaning, scope 
and contours of “sovereignty” are extensively debated.  Nonetheless, certain core 
elements provide a common thread to analysis of sovereignty (although their precise 
value, importance, and necessity remain contested).  At a minimum, a sovereign state is 
expected to have three elements:  “territory, people, and a government.”9  A sovereign 
state must have de facto supremacy and control (at least in some measure) over its 
territory and people (the internal component).10  That is, the state represents the supreme 
source of authority on internal matters.11  Additionally, a sovereign state must exhibit 
some de facto external independence – “not the supremacy of one state over others but 
independence of one state from its peers.”12    
Even at this preliminary stage two observations about sovereignty emerge.  First, 
the sovereignty idea places the “state” front and center.  The sovereignty focused view of 
the world conceives of states as the primary actors and cannot envision a world without 
them:13  “Sovereignty designates states as the only actors with unlimited rights to act in 
the international system.  Assertions by other agencies are subject to challenge.  If the 
constitutive principle of sovereignty were altered, it is difficult to imagine that any other 
international regime would remain unchanged.”14  This idea of the “state” as paramount 
runs through the two dominant theoretical branches in international relations theory -- 
neoliberalism and neorealism.  Both of these schools share a common premise – that 
states are the central (and rational) actors in international relations.  Although other forces 
may be at work, and merit consideration, the state remains the primary focus.15
                                                                                                                                                 
during the medieval period.  See, e.g., James, supra note __ at 3-4; see also Joseph R. Strayer, ON THE 
MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 10 (1970) (“the Roman Empire was a state [b]ut we are looking 
for the origins of the modern state, and the modern state did not derive directly from any of these early 
examples.”); James E. Dougherty & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 10-11 (2001) (discussing the role of Jean Bodin (1530-1596) in formulating the modern 
sovereign state system). 
9 James, supra note __ at 13; Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 33.  See also, Thomas J. Biersteker & 
Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCT 1,  3 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996). 
10 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139, 142 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [hereinafter Human Rights] 
(“Sovereignty is a system of political order based on territory.  The territorially grounded nature of 
sovereignty distinguishes it from other forms of political order such as tribes . . . .”). 
11 See, e.g., Spruyt, supra note __ at 38-39 (outlining the differences between a feudal organizational 
structure (which lacked exclusive territorial domain and lacked a final source of authority) and a sovereign 
territorial structure); see also, Strayer, supra note __ at 8, 45.  For example, some matters of internal 
governance could not be appealed to another state, or an external religious authority, as was common in the 
Middle Ages with the expansive power of the Christian Church.  See, e.g., James, supra note __ at 228-29  
(domestic dimensions of sovereignty). 
12 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 37. 
13 See generally Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 163. 
14 Krasner, Structural Causes supra note __ at 17-18; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “Toward an 
Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,” 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1760 (2003) (noting that “[o]f all the possible 
organization forms political activities could assume, the contemporary nation state is the ‘preferred form of 
sovereign responsible actor.’” (quoting John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. 
Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation State,” 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 158 (1977))). 
15 See, e.g., Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, supra note __ at 68, 97-98, 166-68; Arthur Stein, WHY NATIONS 
COOPERATE 4, 7 (1990) (defining realism and liberalism). 
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Second, despite extensive debates in the literature regarding sovereignty, there is 
no expectation that to claim sovereignty a state must demonstrate complete satisfaction of 
all of the underlying elements.  This is true on both a conceptual level and on a more 
practical one.  Conceptually, all nation-states are impacted and affected by the decisions 
of other nation-states.  Even the most powerful states must take into account the desires, 
needs and views of other states in pursuing their own agendas.  Tax commentators have 
long recognized this reality, as discussed in Part II below.  Sovereignty, in some sense, is 
never a truly absolute quality.   
On the more practical level, states vary widely in the degree to which they possess 
and demonstrate the elements of sovereignty delineated above:  “Historically, one or the 
other of the major principles associated with sovereignty has always been under 
challenge. . . . Only a few states have actually possessed all of the major attributes that 
are associated with sovereignty – territoriality, autonomy, recognition, and effective 
control – the United States being the most obvious case.  Hence, in some sense, almost all 
of the states of the world have been semi-sovereign.”16  The reality that states vary 
considerably in their real power does not undermine the operation of the sovereignty 
concept.17  Nor is sovereignty synonymous with power – some nations with minimal 
economic or military power may face little challenge to their territorial control, whereas 
other presumably more powerful nations can break apart (such as the Soviet Union).18  
However, related to these practical observations, sovereign status seems to be a partial 
one way street.  Problems that might cause a state difficulty in gaining sovereign status 
(for example, unstable domestic control) might be overlooked once sovereign status has 
been achieved, and will not cause the state to lose such status.19
The definition of sovereignty has been expanded by some to incorporate ideas of 
“legitimacy.” 20  Not only should a sovereign state demonstrate basic supremacy and 
control over its territory and people, it should accomplish this through exercise of 
authority that is “legitimate” in terms of the source, exercise and recognition of the 
                                                 
16 Stephen D. Krasner, “Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm,” 30 CORNELL INT’L 
L. J. 651, 652 (1977) [hereinafter “Semi-Sovereigns”].  See generally Chayes & Chayes, supra note __ at 
27 (“The largest and most powerful states can sometimes get their way through sheer exertion of will, but 
even they cannot achieve their principal purposes – security, economic well-being, and a decent level of 
amenity for their citizens – without the help and cooperation of many other participants in the system. . . . 
Smaller and poorer states are almost entirely dependent on the international economic and political system 
for nearly everything they need to maintain themselves as functioning societies.”). 
17 Obvious differences in the power and attributes possessed by different states, while not undermining the 
concept of sovereignty per se, have generated debated as whether those differences are part of sovereignty 
(i.e. whether what sovereignty precisely means varies by state) or comes after sovereignty (i.e. all sovereign 
states possess specified qualities as part of being sovereign, and remaining differences are simply those of 
history and dynamic state relations).  See, e.g., Fowler & Bunk, supra note __ at 63-82.  
18 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 29 
19 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 42.  See also Robert Jackson, QUASI STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 23-24 (1990) (observing that international society has 
modified its treatment of marginal states: “They are not allowed to disappear juridically – even if for all 
intents and purposes they have already fallen or been pulled down in fact.  They cannot be deprived of 
sovereignty as a result of war, conquest, partition, or colonialism such as frequently happened in the past. . . 
. The rules of sovereign statehood have changed in the direction of far greater international toleration and 
accommodation of marginal governments than has been the case since the emergence of the Western-
dominated universal international society in the mid nineteenth century.”). 
20 See, e.g., Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 38 (citing the work of Raymond Aron and Alan James) 
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power.21  We see throughout the 20th century increased attention to and links between 
“legitimacy, responsibility, and international recognition”22 of the sovereignty state.  The 
increased role for legitimacy and responsibility drive changes in areas such as human 
rights and colonial rule.23  For example, “in the 1890s the international community 
entitled a sovereign state to treat its citizens as it pleased.  A century later, human rights 
campaigns . . . sharply challenged this historical entitlement.”24  Following World War I, 
the beginnings of advocacy for human rights could be witnessed in the work of the 
International Labour Organization.25  Up until that time, questions of human rights were 
understood “as the exclusive preserve of the state.”26  The post World War II27 period 
ushered in an era of growing attention to human rights and a corresponding shift in the 
understanding of the sovereign state’s rights and responsibilities.28  This shift produced 
two potentially competing threads into the international community of states that persist 
today and surface in the taxation case studies – (1) broadening what it means to be a 
sovereign state to include the protection and promotion of citizen welfare and (2) 
accepting international scrutiny, and in some cases organized effort, to evaluate and 
ensure that states meet these obligations to their citizens. 
Similarly, changing views on sovereignty and colonial rule in the 20th century also 
marked a development that reverberated in the tax arena, as discussed more extensively 
in the tax competition case study in Part II.  Through the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, more powerful sovereign nations engaged in empire building.  At that time, 
“states . . . claimed, and the international community acknowledged, the sovereign right 
to acquire and govern colonies.”29  Once again, with the advent of World War II, the idea 
                                                 
21  A state’s exercise of political power is legitimate where: “it is acquired and exercised according to 
established rules; -- the rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs about the rightful source 
of authority and . . . the proper ends . . . of government,” and  “authority [is] confirmed by the express 
consent or affirmation on the part of the appropriate subordinates and other legitimate authorities.”  David 
Beetham & Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 16, 16 (Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich, eds., 1998).  See also infra note [65]. 
22 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 6. 
23 Fowler & Bunck, supra note _ at 39.  Twentieth century independence movements by former colonies 
received broader support as the “former” imperial state’s control over the colony lost its legitimacy.  
Fowler & Bunck, supra note __at 39; see Inis L. Claude, Jr., THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 96 (1967).  
For example, the United Nations has striven “to delegitimize colonialism, to invalidate the claim of colonial 
powers to legitimate possession of overseas territories – in short, to revoke their sovereignty over colonies.”  
Claude, supra, at 96. 
24 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 73.  
25 See Jack Donnelly, “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,” 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 614 (1986). 
26 Donnelly,  supra note __ at 614. 
27 See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin 
America,” 47 INT’L ORG. 411, 413 (1993) (“[U]ntil World War II, in the widest range of issues the 
treatment of subjects remained within the discretion of the state; no important legal doctrines challenged 
the supremacy of the state’s absolute authority within its borders.”).  See also, Donnelly, supra note __ at 
614-15 (World War II marks a decisive break; the defeat of Germany ushered in the contemporary 
international human rights regime.”). 
28 See, e.g., Sikkink, supra not __ at 414 (observing that “if sovereignty is a shared set of understandings 
and expectations about the authority of the state, and is reinforced by practices, then a change in 
sovereignty will come about by transforming understandings and practices.” ). 
29 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 73.  See also, Stephen D. Krasner, Review: “Sovereignty Redux,” 3 
INT’L STUD. REV. 134, 135 (2001) (“Nineteenth-century imperialism, which required the European states to 
claim the right to rule over wide swaths of the earth’s territory, required a doctrine drawn from national 
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of colonialism “became controversial and finally unacceptable in principle.”30  States no 
longer claimed the right to colonial rule, and “various imperial states voluntarily 
relinquished sovereignty over former colonies, as the British did in Belize, various 
Caribbean states, and Australia.”31  Moreover, as former colonies moved past their 
colonial status, they also began to assert rights not previously recognized as part of the 
sovereign’s general set of powers: “[E]xpropriation and nationalization of foreign owned 
property – which was typically barred under international law in the past, [became] a 
sovereign right and a legal act.”32  The impetus for change came from the newly 
independent states of the 1950s and 60s which “refused to consider themselves bound by 
a law in whose formation they had not participated . . . [t]he law of expropriation 
attracted their special animus since it purported to place strict limitations on how they 
could deal with foreign investors in control, at the time of independence, of many of the 
new states’ natural resources.”33  The tax competition case study in Part II (and the 
position of the tax haven states) can be viewed as analogous to that of the former colonies 
regarding expropriation rules. 
Not only has sovereignty been an evolving concept, some contend it is evolving 
straight toward extinction.  At various points sovereignty has been declared dead, or 
dying.34  Given the obvious continued existence of many traditional states, such as the 
United States, why is this claim made?  The rise of international organizations and the 
recognition that states are not the only actors in the international arena35 have contributed 
to the analytical shift.  One view holds that the combination of multinational, 
transnational and global forces (including the growth of multinational organizations and 
                                                                                                                                                 
sovereignty [which emphasized the state’s power and authority as unconstrained] rather than constitutional 
sovereignty [which viewed the power and authority of the state as constrained].  The state was the final 
authority – the final arbiter over its own actions, including occupying foreign lands and governing alien 
populations.”). 
30 Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence 
and the Third World,” 41 INT’L ORG. 519, 526 (1987). 
31 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 73.  Another area which saw a shift in the rights of a sovereign state 
involved declarations of war:  “A century ago sovereignty implied that a state could go to war whenever it 
pleased.  Once again, states have renounced such a sovereign prerogative.”  Id. 
32 Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 75.  See generally, Karol N. Gess, “Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources: An Analytical Review of the United Nations Declaration and Its Genesis,” 13 THE 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 398 (1964) (reviewing the history, process and debates underlying the U.N. resolution 
in 1962 on sovereignty over natural resources); Patrick M. Norton, “A Law of the Future or a Law of the 
Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation,” 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 478 (1991) 
(describing the role played by the 1962 U.N. resolution in the changing views on expropriation and 
nationalization). 
33 Norton, supra note __ at 478.  However, the shift toward greater acceptance of states’ rights to engage in 
expropriation or nationalization has not been entirely one directional.  See Rudolf Dolzer, “New 
Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property,” 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 555-56 (1981).  The 
decades following the independence of the former colonies may be less pertinent and less reflective of 
actual practice, as countries have renegotiated many contracts, and may view foreign investment as 
desirable.  Norton, supra note __ at 496-97. 
34 See, e.g., James, supra note __ at 3 (noting assertions by some scholars that “sovereignty” was on the 
decline). 
35 See Diane M. Ring, “International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications,” 60 TAX L. REV. 83, 145-46, 
152-53 (2007) (discussing the role of nonstate actors in international tax policy). 
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multinational corporations, “MNCs”) has weakened the authority of the state.36  Under 
this view, states are on the decline as their power “leak[s] away, upwards, sideways, and 
downwards.”37  Among the various mechanisms by which state power is drained away 
are the array of international laws and principles with which states must, to varying 
degrees, comply: “According to conventional wisdom, there is a structural tension 
between state sovereignty and a range of practices including compliance with 
international obligations, participation in multilateral regimes, and acceptance of 
international principles.  Major concerns include preserving national control over 
domestic legal and policy choices, and . . . avoiding exogenous constraints on sovereign 
prerogatives, especially in the area of national security.”38   
However, not all analyses of globalization adopt the view that the changing nature 
of international activity inherently spells the decline of the state.39  Some observers 
believe that these concerns about internationalization “are at best mispecified and at 
worst misleading.”40  Others offer an even more affirmative characterization of the 
impact of the modern global system on state sovereignty in the financial context:  “[With 
the] tightening linkage between domestic and foreign policies . . . [i]t is tempting to 
exaggerate the degree to which governments may be vulnerable to buffeting financial 
market volatility.  Nevertheless, governments still make the policies that affect interest 
rates, investment, taxation, the value of currency, capital flows, and so on.”41  For those 
who see a long future for the nation-state, the concept of sovereignty has nonetheless 
continued to evolve.  Under this new “schema,” state sovereignty has not dissipated or 
declined but it has transformed.42  What does this new sovereignty look like?  The focus 
has shifted “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal 
functions and external duties.”43  Effectively, the sovereignty concept has morphed to 
absorb (not be undermined by) the important 20th century changes regarding the proper 
role of the nation state.  In this new world, international organizations can enable a state 
to perform its functions of protection and promotion of welfare in an era of truly global 
intersections of peoples, goods, and ideas.  This reliance on the international community 
exists not only in those states that depend on international organizations to satisfy some 
                                                 
36 See, e.g.,  Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, supra note __ at 32-33 (reviewing competing views on the health of 
the modern state); Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,” 76 Foreign Affairs 50, 53 (Jan./Feb. 1997) 
(characterizing nongovernmental organizations as increasingly powerful entities that frequently fulfill state 
functions and direct and shape state action: “Today’s NGOs deliver more official development assistance 
than the entire U.N. system (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).”). 
37 Susan Strange, “The Defective State,” 124 DAEDALUS 56 (Spring 1995) (quoted in Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, supra note __ at 33). 
38 Goodman & Jinks, supra note __ at 1785; see also Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the States?  Reflections 
on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,” 50 WORLD POLITICS 62, 70-71 (Oct. 1997) (most states are 
constrained by international norms, structures, and agreements (including GATT and WTO) in their efforts 
to make unilateral state decisions favoring their local economy/state). 
39 See, e.g., Fowler & Bunck, supra note __ at 1-4 (discussing predictions of the decline of sovereignty and 
its importance). 
40 Goodman & Jinks, supra note __ at 1785. 
41 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, supra note __  at 33. 
42 Although there has been “no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. . . there is necessary re-
characterization involved. . .” Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand 
Themes of UN Reform,” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 619, 628 (2005). 
43 Slaughter, supra note __ at 628. 
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of the basic responsibilities of a state to its citizens, but also among states with more 
extensive resources that nonetheless face problems extending far beyond their borders.44   
 
B. FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN TAXATION 
Sovereignty-based arguments appear regularly in tax debates, discussions, 
analyses and commentaries as states consider the degree to which they should cooperate, 
coordinate, or defer to the views of other states.  Often the reference is quite explicit, with 
the formal language of sovereignty highlighted.  In other cases, the term itself may not 
appear, but the characterization of why some action or non-action is a problem implicitly 
relies on an underlying norm and expectation of tax sovereignty.  Certain topics, such as 
tax rates, seem particularly vulnerable to critiques based on sovereignty.  Other topics, 
such as definitions, appear more amenable to shared decision-making although even 
there, if the definitions at issue have a strong unilateral impact, sovereignty objections 
might surface.45  Why, however, are tax issues such powerful lightning rods for critics 
concerned about sovereignty? Several interconnected reasons may explain this 
phenomenon, but the two dominant functional reasons are revenue and fiscal policy 
control.   
 
1.  REVENUE  
 Perhaps the most fundamental function of taxation is raising revenue to pay for 
governmental expenses and programs.  "Taxes are necessary to raise revenue for public 
goods and infrastructure, as well as to provide other sorts of public services conducive to 
general welfare and economic growth."46 Tax revenues pay for the necessary goods – like 
national defense or a legal system – that an unregulated market cannot provide by itself.47  
In fact, the link between taxes and “necessary” state revenues is typically considered so 
obvious that tax analysts, politicians, government officials and tax reformers of all stripes 
presume the connection in their commentary.  For example, advocates of strong 
government and a social safety net argue that protecting the state’s ability to levy taxes is 
crucial to allowing the state to continue these functions.  Conversely, advocates of the 
market view of government services argue that guaranteeing nations the flexibility to 
“compete” on their tax systems (an issue considered below in more detail) “ensures” 
efficient government.48
                                                 
44 See supra text accompanying note ____.    This observation also resonates with the idea from the U.N. 
secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of “confronting states with a 
direct choice of accepting conditional sovereignty in return for the kind of effective collective action that 
has become indispensable to performing a sovereign’s basic obligations to its people.”  Slaughter, supra 
note __ at 620. 
45 See the case studies reviewed in Part II. 
46 Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Eric M. Zolt, “Inequality and Taxation: Evidence from the Americas on How 
Inequality May Influence Tax Institutions,” 59 TAX L. REV. 167, 167-68 (2006). 
47 Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, “Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 
56 TAX L. REV. 157, 170 (2003).  Today, personal income taxes are the federal government's most 
important general source of revenue.  IRS Data Book for 2006, Table 1 at 3. 
48 This argument can extend into the classic “Leviathan” argument which views government spending as 
inherently undesirable, and views steps to reduce “funding” the state as appealing because the government 
cannot spend what it does not collect.  Regardless of the desirability of government spending, the 
connection between taxes and spending is presumed. Collecting the money to fund that government and 
then setting up that government to determine its scope, size and function in society are therefore two core 
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At the founding of the United States, the states themselves appreciated the 
importance of revenue collection to the effective, if not the literal, existence of state 
government.49  Supporters of local control claimed that “the [taxing] powers given to the 
federal body . . . will necessarily destroy the state sovereignties for there cannot exist two 
independent sovereign taxing powers in the same community.”50  At the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention in 1787, the outnumbered advocates for state power feared “that the 
national government would ‘monopolize every source of revenue [and] indirectly 
demolish the State governments.’”51  Convention participants did not mistake the link 
among taxes, sovereignty, power and revenue. 
 
2. FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 Taxes, however, do more than simply raise revenue: "Any tax that produces 
revenue will in some way alter the social and economic order."52  Taxes that only raise 
revenue without effecting other changes do not exist in the real world.53  For example, if 
a very high tax rate is imposed on the highest income bracket in an effort to boost tax 
revenue, taxpayers in that bracket may be forced into "comparative idleness"54 – they will 
choose leisure over earning such highly taxed income.  The concept of fiscal policy 
captures that link between revenue collection and government spending.  The hope 
throughout the twentieth century has been that a nation’s fiscal policy can shape overall 
demand in the economy, growth, stability of prices, and full employment.55  When used 
in concert with a complete government policy, states expect that taxes can be used to 
control the pace and direction of the economy.56  The 2008 stimulus package passed by 
the U.S. Congress included one-time tax rebates explicitly premised on this belief.57   
More specifically, taxes can be used to increase or decrease inflation and purchasing 
power, stimulate investment, and prevent harmful concentrations of wealth.58 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
facets of being a sovereign state.  See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, “Legitimacy and the Right of 
Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric In American,” 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 882 
(2002) (“Taxes are directly tied to legitimacy of any government because governments need a cheap, 
steady source of revenues to survive.”);  Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1898) (“The power to tax . . . 
.is as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man.”). 
49 Thomas Slaughter, “The Tax Man Cometh: Ideological Opposition to Internal taxes,” 41 WILLIAM & 
MARY Q. 566, 588 (1984) (noting fears that adoption of the U.S. Constitution, with its significant federal 
taxing powers would spell “the death of states governments”). 
50 Id. at 588 (quoting comments of Pennsylvania’s William Findley in 1787). 
51 Id. at 588. 
52 Randolph E. Paul, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 214 (1947). 
53 Paul, supra note __ at  214. 
54 Paul, supra note __ at  415. 
55 See, e.g., James R. Schlesinger, “Emerging Attitudes Towards Fiscal Policy,” 77 POL. SCI. Q.  1,  1-4, 
10-13 (1962).  See also John B. Taylor, “Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy,” 14 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 21 (2000) (considering the role of fiscal policy, particularly in comparison to monetary 
policy at the end of the 20th century). 
56 George A. Nikolaieff, Preface, in TAXATION AND THE ECONOMY 3, 3-4 (George A. Nikolaieff ed., 1968). 
57 See Jt. Comm. On Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 5140 (The 
“Economic Stimulus Act of 2008”), JCX-16-08, Part A (Feb. 8, 2008) (“The [tax] credit mechanism (and 
the issuance of checks. . . ) is intended to deliver an expedited fiscal stimulus to the economy.”) 
58 Paul, supra note __ at 413-14; James R. Repetti, “Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax 
Equity,” __ VAND. L. REV. __ (2008). 
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underlying theory for much of this is Keynesian economics.59 To simplify–quite 
substantially–that theory for our purposes: when an economy is too slow, taxes can be 
reduced to increase the capital available to consumers to reduce unemployment and 
increase demand and production. During economic booms, when high inflation becomes 
a problem, taxes can be raised to reduce the capital available to consumers and reduce 
demand.60  However, the link between tax and economic behavior is not entirely new.  
As far back as Alexander Hamilton, American officials have used taxes as a tool to 
influence business activity and not merely raise revenue (Hamilton believed that an 
inheritance tax would foster small proprietorships).61  In addition to its role in managing 
the economy, the tax system can and is used regularly to influence arenas not generally 
viewed as market or economy related, through provisions such as the adoption credit 
(IRC section 23), the child credit (IRC section 24), the exemption from income of certain 
prizes and awards (IRC section 74(b)), and the exclusion from income of the rental value 
of a parsonage (IRC section 107). 
 
C. WHAT NORMS ARE AT STAKE WHEN STATES ASSERT SOVEREIGNTY? 
The prior subsection noted that nations assert tax sovereignty because they want 
to control revenue and fiscal policy.  This desire is logical, but is there anything beyond 
this functional use of sovereign taxing power?  This subsection contends that four 
important norms62 are at stake as nations struggle to claim or maintain tax sovereignty:  
(1) democratic accountability,  (2) democratic legitimacy, (3) local control/multiple 
sovereigns, and (4) competing exercises of sovereign state power.  The first two points 
reflect the importance of certain democratic measures and systems for states whose own 
legitimacy is based on democratic rule.  The third point considers what would be 
desirable even if democracy concerns could be eliminated, and the final point considers 
the normative problem created when there are competing sovereignty claims.   
  
1.   THE DEMOCRACY PROBLEMS  
 For nations relying on democratic rule for their legitimacy, the assertion of 
sovereignty and the concomitant resistance of efforts to surrender national decision 
making to any type of international body are consistent with a goal of preserving 
legitimacy of the state. The “sense of legitimacy that underpins [advanced industrial 
democracies’] political systems, and that undergirds both the actual exercise of political 
authority and the willing deference of those subject to it, rests on the common belief that 
government is responsible to a given people, accountable to that people, and obliged to 
                                                 
59 See George A.Nikolaieff, Introduction to “Longest Boom In History, in TAXATION AND THE ECONOMY 
11, 11-27 (George A. Nikolaieff ed., 1968) (for a brief overview of Keynes's economic theory and impact). 
60 See George A. Nikolaieff, Introduction to “The Reckoning,” in TAXATION AND THE ECONOMY 115, 115-
16 (George A. Nikolaieff ed., 1968). 
61 Paul, supra note __at 214.  Beyond traditional fiscal policy goals, the tax system has been used to 
regulate a wide array of taxpayer behaviors.  For example, some taxes are designed to promote or 
discourage certain types of activity in addition to producing revenue. High taxes on liquor and tobacco are 
one example of this; not only do such taxes produce revenue, but the resulting high prices are supposed to 
decrease consumption of an elastic and harmful commodity.  See id. 
62 These norms, however, are not limited to expressions of tax sovereignty. 
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serve the best interests of that people.” 63  Shifting certain decisions and powers away 
from the nation-state – an act often characterized as a loss of sovereignty – can be 
expected to weaken claims by the state that it operates according to democratic principles 
and that the decisions and policies it pursues are the product of democratic systems.  Why 
is that the case?  As examined below, there are serious concerns about the ability of 
organizations or bodies above the nation state level to satisfy the elements of democratic 
rule.  At the same time, “the historical bearers of democratic legitimacy [the nation states] 
cannot transfer it [their own legitimacy] to another level of governance.”64  Essentially, if 
real power is being transferred to another level of decision-making beyond the state, that 
body must itself earn democratic legitimacy and cannot rely on the pre-existing 
legitimacy of the nation-states.  Moreover, as the states surrender power in this context 
and ultimately implement the resulting policies, the states themselves can be charged 
with failing to operate according to democratic principles. 
To examine the challenges to democracy posed by a state’s loss of sovereignty, it 
is valuable to first consider why states might even consider pursuing paths that would 
impair sovereignty.  Essentially, the motivations for a state transferring some power or 
decision-making to a broader international body are the very set of pressures outlined in 
the introduction.  Globalization decreases a state’s ability to implement and pursue the 
policies of its people65: “[t]here is a danger that political communities will be unable to 
reach a desired goal owing to conditions outside their jurisdiction.”66  Multilateralism 
may provide a way for a nation to effect positive policies for its citizens that it cannot 
implement acting alone 
Although globalization is not a new force, its meaning in the 19th century 
(extensive trade routes and burgeoning empires) contrasts sharply with its role today.  It 
is characterized today by “an international order involving the conjuncture of a global 
                                                 
63 Louis Pauly, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE 1, 1 (Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. 
Pauly eds., 2000).  See also David Beetham & Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union, in 
POLITICAL THEORY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 15, 16-17 (Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich eds., 1998) 
(“[T]he legitimacy of a liberal democratic system depends on three criteria: an agreed definition of the 
people or ‘political nation’ as defining the rightful bounds of the polity; the appointment of public officials 
according to accepted criteria of popular authorization, representativeness and accountability; and the 
maintenance by government of defensible standards of rights protection, or its routine removal in the event 
of ‘failure.’”). 
64 Stephen Newman, Globalization and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE 15, 16 (Michael 
Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2000).  In the context of the European Union the transfer of various 
powers from the member states to the EU bodies has created just this problem: “In transferring legal 
competencies from the national to the supranational level, the democratically elected parliaments in the 
EU’s member states have lost some of their power to shape and control policies.  However, there has been 
no strengthening of the democratic legitimacy on the supranational level to compensate for this weakening 
of democracy on the national level.”  Edgar Grande, Post-National Democracy in Europe, in DEMOCRACY 
BEYOND THE STATE 115, 117-18 (Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2000). 
65 See, e.g., March Plattner, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS?  GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 81-2 (2008) (“The rise of multilateral institutions is a natural response to a shrinking world.  
As cross-border contacts multiply, both in the economy and in other spheres, there is an inevitable need for 
institutions that can address problems that lie beyond the competence of any single state.  Even for a 
superpower like the United States, neither isolationism nor across-the-board unilateralism is a realistic 
option.  The serious argument is about the nature of multilateral institutions and their power vis-à-vis 
national governments.”);  
66 Michal Zurn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State, in DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE 91, 
93 (Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2000). 
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system of production and exchange which is beyond the control of any single nation-state 
(even the most powerful); extensive networks of transnational interaction and 
communication which transcend national societies and evade most forms of national 
regulations; the power and activities of a vast array of international regimes and 
organizations, many of which reduce the scope for action of even the leading states; and 
the internationalization of security structures which limit the scope for the independent 
use of military force by states.”67  The European Union, for example, has been described 
as not just “a loss of national autonomy in social and economic regulation . . . [but also] 
the emergence of a system in which states can collectively regain some regulatory control 
over otherwise untrammeled processes of globalization.”68  Given that nation-states face 
problems of a global scale but possess powers generally limited to the national level, it is 
not surprising that states turn to multilateralism as a remedy.  The question remains, why 
is this remedy a risk to the democratic foundations of these sovereign nations?  Extensive 
attention has been devoted to the democratic implications of international organizations 
and international governance mechanisms; however, for purposes of this sovereignty 
inquire it is valuable to focus on two interrelated dimensions of concern – accountability 
and legitimacy. 
 
a.   DEMOCRACY ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability is often seen as lacking in international organizations,69 due in part 
to the view that accountability is grounded in an electoral process, which is not feasible 
on a global scale.70  At the global level, there is no firm concept of "citizenship" or a 
"people" in the traditional sense, and without a polity, elections are not possible.71  Of 
course there is some measure of accountability at the global level, but it exists only 
through multiple levels of delegation.72 Although some degree of delegation may be both 
necessary and functional, there is a generally held belief that "long chains of delegation 
simply make for poor democracy."73  The EU faces this critique of its multilevel 
governance structure: “the lack of responsiveness of the elected members of the European 
parliament to the preferences and interests of their constituents. . . [and the] basic 
                                                 
67 David Held, Democracy and the New International Order, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 96, 101 
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995). 
68 Thomas Christiansen, Legitimacy Dilemmas of Supranational Governance, in POLITICAL THEORY AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 98, 102(Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich eds., 1998). 
69 “It is generally acknowledged that all institutions lack democratic procedures and compare badly with 
democratic nation-states in this regard.” Thomas D. Zweifel, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS & 
DEMOCRACY 13 (2006); see also Terry MacDonald & Kate MacDonald, “Non-Electoral Accountability in 
Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Controls Within the Global Garment Industry,” 17 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 89, 90 (2006). 
70 MacDonald & MacDonald, supra note __ at 118. 
71 Steve Charnitz, “Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests,” 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 173, 198 
(2000). 
72 Charnitz, supra note __ at 198.  This layering and delegation has been compared to the accountability of 
Supreme Court justices or Federal Reserve Board members in this United States.  Joseph S. Nye, 
“Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How To Make International Institutions More Accountable,” 80 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 5 (July/Aug. 2001) (the citizens of a country elect their national officials who then 
elect or delegate authority to international officials just as U.S. voters elect their president and members of 
Congress whom ultimately select the justices and the Federal Reserve Board members). 
73 Kal Raustiala, “Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law,” 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
841, 853 (2003). 
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difficulty [in] applying the principle of representation to the multilevel system of 
European decision making leads to gaps of accountability and deficits of individual 
control.”74  Similar arguments about democratic accountability have been raised against 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade 
Organization.75  The United Nations also suffers from accountability problems because 
its agenda setting “has been far from democratic, given the low level of citizens’ 
representation and participation.”76
Related to the issue of accountability of the international body absorbing these 
formally nation-state decisions is the question of transparency.77  The same layering of 
responsibility and the delegation of power up from the state to the international body that 
generates accountability problems also limits transparency.  Because of their bureaucratic 
nature, international institutions rarely allow outside access to the details of their 
decision-making.78  Without this access, a powerful or opportunistic group might "hijack 
the agenda" without the knowledge of the countries or groups affected by its actions.79  
Although many of these concerns regarding democratic global governance (including 
accountability and transparency) might be improved through institutional re-design, they 
nonetheless, convey a broad-based critique and wariness of the democratic quality of 
decision-making at a regional or global level.  Moreover, such institutional redesigns 
would likely impact the effectiveness of the organization and its ability to reach 
decisions, and reach them on a timely basis.80  
Yet there is reason to believe that the degree of democratic governance might 
closely impact the effectiveness of a tax system.  One example of the importance and 
implications of enhanced democratic governance on taxation emerged from studies in the 
1990s looking at tax compliance in 25 Swiss cantons.  One analysis (Frey) argues that the 
type of constitution (i.e. direct democratic processes v. representative democratic 
processes) impacts taxpayer compliance.81  In a study of 25 Swiss cantons for the years 
1965, 1970, and 1978, Frey concluded that “tax morale” (measured by reference to 
                                                 
74 Grande, supra note __ at 125-126. 
75 Giandomenico Majone, State, Market and Regulatory Competition in the European Union, in 
CENTRALIZATION OF FRAGMENTATION? EUROPE FACING THE CHALLENGES OF DEEPENING, DIVERSITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY 94, 122 (Andrew Moravcsik ed., 1998). 
76 Yoshikazu Sakamoto, The Untied Nations and World Order in Democratic Transition, in BETWEEN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE – THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 274, 
284 (Albert J. Paolini,  et al. eds. 1998). 
77 See, e.g., Grande, supra note __ at 126 (“A lack of transparency and openness in the [E.U.] policy 
process intensifies problems of control and accountability.”); Philip Alston, “Promoting Accountability of 
Members of the New UN Human Rights Council,” 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 49, 54 (2005). 
78 Alston, supra note __ at 54. 
79 Basu at 499. 
80 For example, those who advocate changing various processes within the EU to increase accountability, 
individual participation and transparency, acknowledge that these steps are likely to decrease the 
effectiveness of the EU.  See, e.g., Grande, supra note __ at  127 (“The problem is that demands for 
transparency and openness are incompatible with the functional requirements of consensus democracy . . . . 
Increasing the transparency of the European decision-making process by making Council meetings public 
would either necessitate an introduction of majority rule or would weaken the effectiveness of the policy 
process considerably.  Since both of these alternatives are undesirable, we are forced to conclude that a lack 
of transparency and openness will remain a structural feature of the European decision-making process.”). 
81 Bruno S. Frey, “A Constitution For Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtue,” 107 THE ECON. J. 1043, 1050 
(1997) (exploring the factors beyond deterrence that contribute to law abiding behavior). 
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undeclared income) was higher in those cantons with more direct democratic processes.82  
That is, tax compliance was higher in the cantons whose constitutional structure was 
categorized as more directly democratic than in those cantons whose constitutional 
structure was categorized as more representative.83  It seems reasonable to assume that 
creating this kind of taxpayer intimacy with the government and the tax system (through 
more direct democratic features) should be easier in a “smaller” governmental unit as 
opposed to a large unit, such as a single world government.    
Thus, not only are accountability and representation (along with the necessary 
transparency) central to democratic processes, a strong democratic process with a close 
link between the citizen-taxpayer and the government may improve participation in the 
tax system.  A country seeking to encourage tax compliance would have reason to worry 
if the political system widened the gap between taxpayers and policy makers.  
 
b.  DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
As noted above, there are steps that can be taken in an international institution to 
improve the quality of the democratic process by broadening accountability, 
participation, and transparency – but those changes are not cost free.  The institution’s 
effectiveness will likely be impeded.  Moreover, even if such process and structural 
changes are implemented (and any corresponding loss in institutional effectiveness is 
tolerated), other democracy problems can continue to undermine the legitimacy of the 
institution, its process, and its outcomes:  “While some observers situate the problem of 
democratic legitimacy in the workings of the EU and other international institutions, 
[other observers] question the very possibility of democratic processes beyond the nation-
state.  In their view, democratic legitimacy is possible only within the framework of a 
demos – that is, a political community expressed in the concept of the nation.  Beyond the 
nation-state, there is no strong sense of public interest, and the potential for political 
regulation is limited.”84  These limitations may be felt most strongly in situations of 
majority rule where the expectation is that the decision of the majority is binding and 
those who are outvoted should accept the outcome.85  However, “the outvoted actors will 
accept the decision only if the decision-making process is deemed legitimate and 
sanctions are applied for noncompliance.”86  But when will legitimacy and sanctions 
both emerge?  It is expected that “legitimacy . . . and a willingness to establish a system 
                                                 
82 Frey, supra note __ at 1050-1051.  Werner W. Piommerehne and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann also 
conducted a study of these Swiss cantons for the same tax years, and among their conclusions observed that 
“the extent of political participation of citizens/taxpayers has a clear and stable effect, thus indicating the 
substantial influence of policy acceptance on taxpayers’ adherence to tax laws.”  Werner W. Piommerehne 
& Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, “Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in 
Switzerland,” 88 PUB. CHOICE 161, 168 (1996).  [Note that due to a split in one of the cantons in 1979, 
there are now 26 cantons]. 
83 Frey, supra note __ at 1051 (1997).  Direct democratic elements in the constitutional structure included 
such features as “citizens’ meetings, obligatory and optional referenda and initiatives.”  Id. at 1050.  See 
generally Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Fey, “Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax 
Morale,” University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research and Economics, Working Paper No, 284 
(April 2006). 
84 Zurn, supra note __ at 95. 
85 Id. at 95-96.  See also Grande, supra note __ at 119-120. 
86 Zurn, supra note __ at 95-96 (emphasis added). 
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of sanctions [will] develop within the framework of a political community, and so, 
without a demos, there seems to be no basis for a democratic majority decision.”87   
Assuming that a demos is central to democratic legitimacy, why is it not possible 
to create a demos at a level beyond the nation state?  Certainly there is no a priori rule 
that bars recognition or creation of a demos beyond the state – it “is not a prepolitical 
quantity, the result of cultural or ethnic homogeneity.”88  However, a demos cannot be 
created by “mere fiat” either.89  The legitimacy of majority rule depends on “a pre-
existing sense of community – of common history or common destiny, and of common 
identity.”90  The absence of a demos does not mean that an international organization or 
body cannot accrue power, rather it limits the degree of legitimacy:  “In the absence of a 
transnational demos, coercive power can in principle flow to the global level, but the 
legitimacy of its exercise will remain profoundly questionable.  And in the absence of a 
shared sense of legitimate governance, even the obvious winners in the global capitalist 
resurgence will have cause to worry about the durability of their gains.”91  
One of the more plausible candidates for a transnational demos, the European 
Union, does not currently possess this level of community sensibility, thereby increasing 
fears of a democratic deficit.92  Accordingly, the EU might more aptly be characterized 
as an intergovernmental organization: “there is no real ‘European public space.’  The 
peoples of the EU speak many different languages.  Their media, their party systems, and 
their politics as a whole are essentially national.  A common argument holds that there is 
no European demos, and hence the EU cannot be a real democracy.”93
It should not be surprising that democracy might be more responsive and 
ultimately viewed as more legitimate when practiced on a smaller scale: “[i]t is much 
easier to design institutions that are locally democratic, than globally democratic, 
particularly in terms of responsiveness to the ‘cultural’ aspects of what counts as 
democratic decision-making; moreover, preferences and social circumstances are likely 
to be more homogenous within localities [than] across a set of boundaries.”94  To the 
extent that sovereign states push power and decision making up the chain to international 
organizations (i.e. to the extent that they surrender sovereignty), the decisions that 
emerge may suffer from a lack of democratic legitimacy precisely because the decisions 
are applied across a population that does not constitute a demos with a collective sense of 
interconnected commitment to the enterprise.  Whether these limitations are severe 
enough to demand that the sovereign state recall its power from the international body (or 
not surrender it initially) depends on the nature of the powers in question and the 
necessity for a coordinated global response. 
                                                 
87 Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added). 
88 Id. at 98-99. 
89 Grande, supra note __ at 120 (quoting Fritz W. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the 
Welfare States,” 4  J. OF EUR. PUBLIC POL’Y 20 (1977) and describing the community necessary to render 
majority rule legitimate). 
90 Grande, supra note __ at 119-120 (quoting Fritz W. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the 
Welfare States,” 4 J. of Eur. Public Pol’y 20 (1977). 
91 Louis W. Pauly, Democratic Foundations for a Global Economy, in DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE  
165, 166(Michael Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2000). 
92 See, e.g., Grande, supra note __  at 120;  
93 Plattner, supra note __ at  97. 
94 David Charny, “Regulatory Competition and the Global Coordination of Labor Standards,” 3 J. OF INT’L 
ECON. L. 281, 299 (2000). 
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2. LOCAL CONTROL/ MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS 
Even if we could resolve the democracy problems inherent in decision-making at 
a more global level, should we nonetheless prefer a world in which there are many 
sovereigns making decisions and exercising control at a more local level?  For three 
reasons, the answer might be yes. 
First, the sovereign state system, with localized control over the domestic sphere, 
can facilitate the creation and support of a unique society with a distinctive cultural and 
political identity95 which can pursue its own vision of a desirable society.  The contrast, 
highlighted in the second case study of Part II, between the ideals espoused by England 
and those espoused by Denmark for the proper role and size of government illustrate this 
point.  The domestic control enables each state to promote and serve the goals, values and 
ideals of its own community.  This advantage of the sovereign state system is perhaps 
best appreciated in comparison to a hypothetical single world government96 which does 
not accommodate such local variation.  This is not to suggest that only a system premised 
on sovereign states can achieve preservation of local cultural and political identity, but 
rather that the sovereign states can do so.97
Second, a multiplicity of sovereign states might enhance the prospects for 
development of creative and alternative policies across many subjects including taxation, 
environmental law, transportation, and securities regulation.  This idea reflects the same 
values that support the existence of multiple courts of appeals and of regulatory 
competition among the states in the United States.  The percolation of ideas in numerous 
laboratories can enhance the likelihood of developing new, successful strategies.   
The third, and related, reason supporting multiple sovereigns is the general 
reservation that accompanies any idea of a world state: “[T]he making of a world state 
                                                 
95 The claim regarding local culture and political identity is not intended to imply the need for single 
ethnicity, single religion communities.  Although more localized control can be desirable, it is anticipated 
that states can and will accommodate multiple groups.  In part, this is a message of the modern human 
rights movement (which supports healthy sovereign states because liberal, non-marginalized states with 
strong civic structures are generally more compliant with human rights standards).  Gregory Fox, New 
Approaches to International Human Rights, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY 105, 127-130 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 
1997).  Human rights law and ideology set the expectation that multi-ethnic, multi-religious communities 
can and should exist successfully – and it is human rights law (and ideals) that helps establish the baseline 
for this heterogeneous interaction.  Fox, supra note ___ at 129-130. 
96 The implications of and objections to a “world state” have been considered in the literature.  See, e.g., 
Louis Cabrera, POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 90 (2004) (“even if it does not seem possible that a 
global government could be created, however long the time horizon, discussion of the objections is 
important, because any objection against global government proposals likely will have some force against 
proposals for less extensive sets of supranational institutions”). 
97 One could readily anticipate the suggestion that if a “world government” were to be rejected on the 
grounds that it provides insufficient local control and variation, then perhaps a basis for grouping other than 
on broad territorial grounds should be preferred.  For example, states could comprise only a single ethnic or 
religious group, thus permitting the value of local control without the conflict created my multiple groups 
within a state.  However, serious practical, social and ethical issues arise.  First, ethnic and religious groups 
do not overlap easily (e.g., a given ethnic group may include many different religious communities, and 
conversely a religious grouping may include members from many different ethnic groups).  Second, ethnic 
and religious groups do not exist in neat territorial packages, so the question remains how to handle the 
geographic dimension – as varying religious and ethnic groups may share the same territory.  Efforts to 
reconstruct, on a global scale, the location of groups to achieve local uniformity, pose significant questions 
on many levels.  
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with a monopoly on force, even if conceived and realized with the most perfect 
democratic constitutional engineering, would risk being transformed, as does any 
institution, into something at variance with the intentions of its founders.”98  Thus, 
democratic legitimacy is not the only reason to question the desirability of something 
approaching a world state, even in we live in a world of global problems. 
 
3.  POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE 
Given the various functional and democracy based rationales a state could 
articulate in justifying its policies and actions on sovereignty grounds, clashes between 
states claiming sovereignty should be anticipated.  What if one state justifies its tax 
policies as necessary to preserve its sovereign control over tax and fiscal powers but 
another state argues that those very policies infringe on its sovereign right to design tax 
and fiscal rules beneficial to its citizens?  The case study in Part II involving the tax 
competition conflict between the OECD and the tax havens could be characterized as just 
such a sovereignty conflict.  How should it be resolved?  Is there a priority of certain 
sovereignty claims over others?  Should other principles be brought into play here?   
For example, if sovereignty is used to justify two states’ competing and 
conflicting tax policies, should the power and status of the states involved be relevant?  
Does it matter that one state (or group of states acting in concert) is using economic and 
political power to “force” the other state to abandon its desired tax policy?  What is an 
appropriate use of power among sovereign nations?  Traditionally, ideas of state 
sovereignty have recognized and accepted inequality among nations both in terms of 
resources and power.  Use of these advantages in negotiating and securing desired 
outcomes have constituted the core of inter-state relations over the centuries.  It is not 
inconsistent with a state’s sovereign status to participate in or accept deals that are less 
than favorable.99
But values other than sovereignty might be relevant in evaluating a battle of 
sovereignty claims.  The question of inter-nation equity frequently appears in discussions 
of international tax policy – with the implications that some redistribution might be 
appropriate among the winning and losing states in the global tax system.  If one of the 
sovereign states engaged in a sovereignty conflict is a regular “loser” under the current 
system, should its sovereignty claim have some measure of priority?  Such a decision 
might be sensible on strategic or economic grounds – particularly where the “losing” 
state has been garnering more leverage over time (think, for example, of the tax havens 
“hiding” income and wealth of OECD resident taxpayers).  Less clear is whether a claim 
for inter-nation equity that is not matched by strategic considerations would have any 
normative bite at this point. 
 
D. WHY THE LANGUAGE OF SOVEREIGNTY? 
If sovereignty claims in taxation are justified based on the functional needs and 
democracy concerns of the state, then why not skip the “sovereignty” label and move 
straight to these assertions?  The answer is that although more attention should be paid to 
                                                 
98 Daniele Archibugi From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy, in Cosmopolitan Democracy 
121, 133 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995). 
99 The effective surrender of certain tax powers likely impairs not the ultimate status of sovereignty but 
rather the adequate performance of functions constitutive of its sovereign status. 
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these grounds generating the sovereignty furor, there are nonetheless several reasons to 
accept a continuing role for the sovereignty language. 
First, sovereignty arguments both pre-suppose and assert the desirability of an 
international system based on sovereign states.  While anarchy may not be the preferred 
world structure for most people contemplating international relations, is sovereignty, with 
its implicit nationalistic focus, a feature to be encouraged and fostered?100  One answer to 
the question is a somewhat practical observation that we have no clear alternative 
organizational principle of international society and international relations in the absence 
of sovereignty, and thus states (with their accompanying sovereignty) are a necessary 
element of our system.101  However, one could argue that even if we lack a ready, 
comprehensive alternative,102 and even if we do not seek to eliminate the role of the state, 
perhaps we should not be gravely concerned when states complain that some event or 
course of action impinges upon their sovereignty.103  Is there any counterclaim that can 
be made for the affirmative value of sovereignty?104  Although a complete defense of the 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 355, 366 
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) [hereinafter Limits](“[C]ertainly through the 18th century, and possibly the 
19th, an international system based on sovereign states was highly congruent with the basic political and 
economic interests both of the rules themselves and of their subjects . . . .[but now] writers associated with 
the world order perspective emphasize the deleterious economic and political consequences of sovereignty 
in a nuclearized interdependent world.”) 
101 See, e.g., Alexander Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and 
Contemporary Considerations,” in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT  80-82 (Thomas Biersteker 
& Cynthia Weber ed., 1996) (observing that despite the range of debates and questions raised, most actors 
and most discussions assuming the centrality of a territorial based notion of the state).  Although there are 
many good questions about the desirability of the territorial approach to political organization, as Murphy 
notes, one has effectively articulated an alterative schema for organizing international relations with the 
state as a central player. Id. at 108-109.  Even though we may discuss and debate the role and activities of 
nonstate actors in the international setting, the basic framework still presupposes an international world 
organized by states.  See, e.g., Krasner, Limits, supra note __ at 367 (“[T]hese arguments, and others that 
could be cited have virtually no impact on the constitutive principle of the present international system.  
Why should this be the case? . . . . There is no consensual knowledge about what principle might replace 
sovereignty.  For another, there are high sunk costs in the existing regimes.  Changing sovereignty would 
also mean a change in the regimes of virtually all other issue-areas. . . .”).  Moreover, it seems unlikely that 
the dominant players in the current system (states) will be eager to institute another structure.  Sovereignty 
has “strongly reinforced the position of the major actor in the system it legitimates – national states 
functioning within specific territorial boundaries. . . . Of all of the actors in the system, states are the least 
likely to be swayed by appeals to transcend sovereignty.”  Id. at 367. 
102 In a related observation, Alan James contends that the elimination of “sovereign states” through, for 
example, the creation of a single world state is no guarantee of peace.  Although the existence of a single 
“superstate” by definition eliminates “war”( understood as conflict between states), there is no reason to 
believe that organized violence by groups (akin to civil conflict) would not emerge.  James, supra note __ 
at  264-65. 
103 See, e.g., James,  supra note __ at 257-261 (outlining “objections” raised by critics of sovereignty to the 
existence and role of sovereignty,  including (1) psychological influence of the term which leads actors to 
un make undesirable decision, and (2) legitimation by sovereignty of the right to war through the structure 
of nationally focused competing states). An array of other critiques of sovereignty have been articulated 
including: (1) a Marxist critique, (2) international organization critique (which views such organizations as 
having a central role in reforming the current world order, (3) supranationalist critique (urging either 
unified world government, or at least regional unification),  and (4) human rights critique.  Fowler & 
Bunck, supra note __ at 128-140 (cataloging some primary criticisms of sovereignty). 
104 Note that the identification of favorable arguments for sovereignty implicitly depends on to what the 
current system of sovereign states is being compared, such as a single world government, or some non-
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sovereign state is beyond the scope of this paper, several observations in the prior 
subsection serve as justification for supporting the sovereignty of states including: (1) 
democracy concerns about the legitimacy of decision-making and accumulation of power 
above the nation state level; and (2) the potential benefits arising from a multiplicity of 
sovereigns each exploring problems and possible solutions.  If these reasons favor the 
continued existence of thriving nation-states, it makes sense to use sovereignty language 
and arguments when state powers crucial to the duties and responsibilities of the state 
(e.g., revenue, fiscal policy) are at risk. 
Second, sovereignty is a form of rhetoric which can be useful (or harmful) 
depending on how it is employed.105  To the extent that state actors or other observers 
perceive particular tax choices, options or decisions as dangerous for the state, it may be 
easier and more effective to attract attention to the matter by designating the issue as one 
of national sovereignty.  The word is expected to alarm the listeners who implicitly 
register that problem as one that might effectively allow their state to be under the control 
of others.  However, because rhetoric can be a tool for “any” side, this alone would be a 
weak argument for continuing to emphasize sovereignty.106
Third, the term sovereignty signals the nature of the complaints through an 
accessible (though arguably vaguer) label.  As most of Part I has established, a sovereign 
state has functional and normative reasons to preserve its decision-making authority and 
power over tax matters.  These reasons relate to both the state’s role within its borders 
(e.g., design and implementation of desired economic and social policy according to 
democratic principles) and as part of the international community (e.g., preserving local 
decision-making where accountability and legitimacy are strongest).  Although the tax 
analysis could immediately shift to these normative and functional concerns without 
reference to the loss of sovereignty, such a leap risks (1) losing the link between these 
concerns and the state’s democratic mission, and (2) having the message obscured in 
details and less familiar language.  A slightly distinct signaling use of sovereignty 
language can be made by non-state actors such as the OECD and the E.U.  Such 
organizations could signal their recognition of and support for sovereignty concerns by 
using that same language back in discussing their visions and goals as well as the limits 
of their plans. 
Fourth, a sovereignty objection can capture the effect of a constellation of 
decisions, and reflect the fact that although any one issue might or might not be crucial 
on tax sovereignty, the totality of events could be troubling.  The state’s goal is to keep 
an eye on what tools remain available to handle fiscal and economic planning.  Many tax 
issues are detailed and sometimes esoteric,107 and their broader and longer-term impact 
may be less readily apparent.  Challenging potential decisions on sovereignty grounds 
can indicate, not that the specific tax question on the table is devastating to state 
sovereignty, but that given the choices already made, the impact of this current decision 
may be underappreciated.   
                                                                                                                                                 
global system of organization based on a connection other than geography (which  the current sovereign 
state system implements). 
105 See generally Kornhauser, supra note __ (examining the impact of tax rhetoric in the United States). 
106 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note __ at 889 (examples of anti-tax rhetoric “meant to conceal what 
politicians are really doing”). 
107 Of course others are not, such as the decision between unanimous and QMV. 
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Thus, the language of tax sovereignty can contribute to domestic and international 
discussions on the allocation of power and policy making.  However, any dialogue 
among political decision makers that ended with sovereignty would be fruitless; it must 
be followed by details and examination of the underlying tax issues. 
 
 SUMMARY 
Emerging from a medieval past, sovereignty and the sovereign state continue to 
play a central role in modern international political life.  Although the ongoing vitality of 
the sovereignty concept has not been without challenge, clearly by any definition 
sovereignty has not died even if its meaning has evolved during the past six hundred 
years.108  Despite debate over the use and relevance of sovereignty today, several key 
observations persist: (1) the state is still a central actor on the international stage; (2) 
international organizations and entities have grown in scope, size and power (in many 
cases states are the members); (3) although the increased interactions among nations at all 
levels –movements of peoples, goods, money, pollution, instability – have decreased 
autonomy (conceived of as a country’s ability to ignore what is going on outside of its 
borders and still achieve its desired policies domestically), the resulting 
interconnectedness of nations has not eliminated their focus on national self interest;109  
(4) sovereignty-based dialogue is alive and well and quite common among nations, 
though it is now expressed as a responsibility to care for its citizens as opposed to 
primarily a means to prevent encroachment;110 and (5) states can identify powerful 
functional goals and normative claims supporting an assertion of tax sovereignty. 
 
 
II.   USES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL TAX 
 
A. U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION  
The United States’ colonial tax history, occupied with disputes over the 
imposition of taxes by distant governments, echoes in many current tax debates.  U.S. 
responses to proposals for international tax cooperation evince a long standing desire to 
reserve tax decisions to the nation-state.  The U.S. experience in the international tax 
competition debate captures this dimension of U.S. tax policy.  This section will outline 
the tax competition issue and then examine U.S. governmental and “popular” reaction to 
the proposals that emerged. 
International tax competition, which became a significant “problem” in the 1980s, 
refers to a country using its tax system to attract investment, activity, or cash flow to the 
country itself.  Common techniques include imposing little or no taxes on certain 
activities or on foreign investors, and not disclosing information to other governments.  
Competing on the basis of tax systems is not new, however, globalization and the 
                                                 
108 See competing views considered by Bierstock & Weber, supra note __ at 4-7. 
109 When they come to the table to discuss issues of shared importance, their primary perspective is that of 
their nation, and their primary goal is the promotion of national (as opposed to global) interests (whether 
they are analyzed in the long or short term). 
110 This point alone would not demonstrate that sovereignty is indeed a powerful force in actual decision 
making in the world – the other evidence demonstrates that– but it does reveal the continued rhetorical 
power of sovereignty both as an appeal (i.e. “we” are entitled to this valuable asset) and as a rallying cry 
(“we” should come together and demand this, take action to obtain this) 
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technological advances of the latter half of the 20th century (including the increased 
mobility in capital) resulted in countries lowering their tax rates to solicit investment 
within their borders.  Why might this be a problem?  The general concern is that although 
some forms of tax competition may be beneficial (i.e. forcing governments to use their 
tax and spending powers efficiently and wisely in the market of sovereign states), other 
forms are not.  These “harmful” forms of competition create a race to the tax revenue 
bottom (particularly for taxes on capital) resulting in the erosion of countries’ tax 
bases.111  At that point, states are typically left with consumption and payroll tax bases 
because investment and capital are significantly more mobile than labor.112  The result is 
a distortion of the taxing burden (more emphasis on regressive taxes) and a decline in 
revenue that could otherwise support the infrastructure and social welfare programs of the 
state.113
In response to growing concern over tax competition, the OECD countries 
espoused a desire to “encourage an environment in which fair competition can take 
place” and to create a “level playing field.”114  In May of 1996 a Ministerial 
Communique directed the OECD to “develop measures to counter the distorting effects 
of harmful tax competition on investment and financing decisions and the consequences 
for national tax bases, and report back in 1998.”115  Ultimately the OECD produced its 
report on harmful tax competition in 1998, which addressed practices of OECD member 
countries116 and nonmember countries.  Although tax competition can occur in a variety 
of settings, the 1998 Report selected geographically mobile activities (e.g., financial 
services, the provision of intangibles) as its focus, reserving other areas of competition 
for further study.117  The report provided a series of factors to identify the “harmful” tax 
practices, enumerated their negative effects, and offered recommendations to respond to 
the problem of harmful tax competition.118   
Three dominant tax competition scenarios were reviewed in the report: (1) a 
country imposing virtually no income tax (potentially a “tax haven”); (2) a country that 
does impose and collect significant individual or corporate income taxes, but which has 
preferential features to the system that enable the income at issue to face little or no 
                                                 
111 See OECD, TAX COMPETITION REPORT, supra note __  (using the term “harmful” tax competition to 
identify the type of tax competition being challenged). 
112 Avi-Yonah,  supra note __ at  1578; see also OECD, TAX COMPETITION REPORT. 
113 See Avi-Yonah, supra note __ at 1577-78. 
114 OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT 4 (2004) 
[hereinafter OECD PROGRESS REPORT ]. 
115 OECD, TAX COMPETITION REPORT, supra note __ at 7. 
116 The original OECD member countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Subsequent members, in chronological 
order through 1998 (i.e. the time of the report) are Japan, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Korea.  After the 1998 report, The Slovak Republic joined in 2000.  
OECD, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note __ at 2; see also  The OECD Website listing  current member 
countries, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
117 OECD, TAX COMPETITION REPORT, supra note __ at 8.  
118 The report made several proposals: (1) establish Guidelines on Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes; (2) 
create a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices; (3) develop a list of tax havens; and (4) recommendations for 
national level legislation and treaty action in response to continued use by any jurisdictions of these 
harmful practices.  Id at 9. 
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taxation; and (3) a country that imposes and collects significant corporate or individual 
income tax but at effective rates lower than those in the “other country.”119  Although 
recognizing that the “other country” (i.e. the residence country of the taxpayer with 
mobile activities) may be unhappy with all three scenarios, the harmful tax competition 
report states that the third scenario is not within its scope.  Moreover, it reiterates that 
there is no intention to “explicitly or implicitly suggest that there is some general 
minimum effective rate of tax to be imposed on income below which a country would be 
considered to be engaged in harmful tax competition.”120  With respect to the first two 
categories (which are addressed), the report discusses the additional factors that cause 
them to constitute harmful practices, including lack of effective exchange of information, 
lack of transparency, lack of substantial activities in the jurisdiction, or (in the case of 
preferential regimes) special geographic or industry limited tax regimes. 121   
Having established categories of harmful tax competition and their deleterious 
effects on other countries, the report observed that unilateral or bilateral efforts can have 
only a limited effect on counteracting these harmful practices:  “The need for co-
ordinated action at the international level is also apparent from the fact that the activities 
which are the main focus of this report are highly mobile. In this context, and in the 
absence of international cooperation, there is little incentive for a country which provides 
a harmful preferential tax regime to eliminate it since this could merely lead the activity 
to move to another country which continues to offer a preferential treatment.”122  Thus 
the report recommended certain domestic level counteracting measures (such as strong 
controlled foreign corporation rules),123 certain treaty changes (including provisions on 
exchange of information and on treaty shopping), and perhaps most significantly from the 
sovereignty debate perspective – certain coordinated steps.124  Among these coordinated 
steps, the report recommended that the OECD member countries approve guidelines on 
harmful preferential tax regimes (including self-evaluation), that the OECD establish a 
Forum to implement the guidelines and to produce a list of tax havens against which to 
apply a coordinated response, and that OECD countries with links to tax havens 
(political, economic, or otherwise) not allow these links to facilitate harmful tax 
competition.125  Ultimately, and presumably in recognition of the fact that many of the 
relevant countries are not OECD members, the report encouraged the Forum (noted 
above) to “engage in a dialogue with non-member countries using, where appropriate, the 
fora offered by other international tax organizations, with the aim of promoting the 
Recommendations” of the report.126  In April 1998, the OECD Council adopted the 
recommendations of the report and directed the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to establish 
a dialogue with non-member countries.127
                                                 
119 Id. at 19-20. 
120 Id. at 20. 
121 Id. at 23, 27. 
122 Id. at 38. 
123 Controlled foreign corporation, or “CFC” rules proscribed circumstances in which a residence country 
may tax its resident corporations on income earned by their foreign subsidiaries in absence of a dividend 
distribution to the parent. 
124 Id. at 46-53. 
125 Id. at 56-58. 
126 Id. at 58. 
127 Id. at 3. 
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Not surprisingly, the OECD report generated a tremendous amount of controversy 
and discussion.  An extensive literature developed surrounding the international tax 
competition question and examined: (1) the quality of the report,128 (2) the substance of 
the tax competition fears (with some agreeing that tax competition can be a serious 
problem that should be addressed, and others questioning the underlying premises and 
suggesting tax competition arguments have been overstated and that more attention 
should be focused on ensuring that taxpayers cannot hide certain income);129 and (3) the 
empirical dimension of tax competition – where and under what circumstances are 
taxpayers making various investment and business decisions on the basis of taxation.130   
Analysis and critique of the OECD project came from another, arguably “less 
objective”131 quarter, and in this context commentators drew upon sovereignty as a major 
lens through which to evaluate tax competition. In 2000, perhaps influenced by the 
OECD’s release of its 2000 report specifically naming havens, a campaign was mounted 
in the United State to challenge the OECD’s efforts in tax competition.  A major force in 
this effort was the Center for Freedom and Prosperity which was organized in October 
2000.  According to its mission statement, the Center’s “top project . . . is the Coalition 
for Tax Competition, which is fighting to preserve jurisdictional tax competition, 
sovereignty, and financial privacy.”132  With respect to sovereignty, the Center states that 
the OECD’s efforts are “ill-advised;” they constitute “an attack on sovereignty” because 
the OECD is trying to “bully ‘tax havens’ into raising their tax rates and eliminating 
financial privacy, . . . [and because the OECD is] assert[ing] the right to interfere with 
American tax laws.  Sovereign nations should be able to determine their own tax 
policies.”133   
The CFP pursued two major directions – lobbying congress and the 
administration against the OECD plan, and urging tax havens to resist the OECD 
efforts.134  And, although the CFP and other organizations with which it has affiliated 
(including the Heritage Foundation and the Cato institute) have been frequently criticized 
for nonobjective and unsupported claims,135 these efforts against the OECD Tax 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., Arthur Wright, “Review: OCD Harmful Tax Competition Report Falls Short,” 17 TAX NOTES 
INT’1 461, 462 (Aug. 17, 1998); Michael McIntyre, “McIntyre Finds Fault with Wright’s Analogy,” 17 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1915, 1915-16 (Dec. 14, 1998); E. Osterweil, “In Defense of the OECD Report on Harmful 
Tax Competition,” 17 TAX NOTES INT’L 895, 895-96 (Sept. 21, 1998); Avi-Yonah, supra note __ at 1597, 
1601, 1658-66. 
129 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note __ passim; Julie Roin, “Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective 
on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L. J. 543 passim (2001). 
130 See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL 
POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997); see also James R. 
Hines, Jr., “Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation,” 52 NAT'L TAX J. 305, 308-19 
(1999) (exploring the empirical evidence that international tax regimes affect individualized corporate 
behavior). 
131 See Alex Easson, “Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD Initiative,” 34 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1037 (June 7, 2004) (characterizing  some of these critics at “less objective”). 
132 Center for Freedom and Prosperity at http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Glance/glance.shtml. 
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., Robert Goulder, “New Coalition Strikes Back at OECD Tax Havens Campaign,” 21 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 2650, 2653-54 (Dec. 2, 2000) [hereinafter “Coalition”] (reporting interviews with CFP 
founders Mitchell and Quinlan who describe their plans to attack the OECD tax competition project). 
135 See, e.g., Easson,  supra note __ at 1052, 1057 (characterizing  some of these critics at “less objective” 
and using hyperbole). 
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Competition project were largely successful.136 Through the CFP’s efforts, members of 
Congress,137 including members of the Black Caucus,138 challenged the U.S. 
participation in the OECD plan and sent letters (often quite similar) to Secretary O’Neill 
outlining their objections to the tax competition project.  The CFP actively courted tax 
havens139 which began to strongly resist the OECD’s plan.  By February of 2001, a senior 
Treasury official commenting on Secretary of Treasury O’Neill’s plans for U.S. 
participation in the OECD project explicitly raised the sovereignty objection:  “He [Paul 
O’Neill] will respect the sovereignty of the various tax systems – that’s very 
important.”140
The “final” success of the campaign against the OECD tax competition project, 
however, came in May 2001 when U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill published a 
statement that: “The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what 
its own tax rates or tax systems should be, and will not participate in any initiative to 
harmonize world tax systems.  The United States simply has no interest in stifling the 
competition that forces governments --- like businesses to create efficiencies.” This 
strong criticism of the OECD project and the effective withdrawal of substantial U.S. 
backing dealt a major blow to the tax competition work.  Although O’Neill’s statement 
was considered by most tax experts to represent a misreading of the tax competition 
project141 (which did not propose rate harmonization and did not reject competition of all 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Thomas Field, “Tax Competition in Europe and America,” 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 1235, 1242-
43 (March 31, 2003) (describing how the CFP plan worked); Easson,  supra note __ at 1052 (same).  See 
also, David S. Cloud, Virginian Fights for International Tax Havens: Lobbying Finds Bush Receptive to 
Ideas Clinton Rejected,  WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at A20 (reviewing the lobbying efforts of the CFP and 
quoting its co-founder Andrew Quinlan: “We’re going to end up generating probably 100,000 pieces of 
mail.”). 
137 Many of these congressional letters were reprinted in Tax Notes International including letters by [  ] .  
Lists of congress members sending letters, along with copies, are also posted on the CFP website.  See also 
Goulder, “Coalition,” supra note __ at 2653 (quoting CFP co-founder Quinlan, “What our coalition has, 
which no one else can claim, is that we are now set to successfully deal with Congress.  We have already 
met with the key players.”).  The CFP’s success on the Congressional front could be seen in the comments 
of  Majority House Leader Dick Armey, “By fighting against an international tax cartel and working to 
preserve financial privacy, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity is protecting taxpayers, both in America 
and around the world.”  Id. at 2653 (noting also that Armey was the first major member of Congress to 
speak out against the OECD tax competition work and to urge the then Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence 
Summers to “withdraw U.S. support for the initiative.”). 
138 The members of the Black Caucus focused their critique on the harm caused to poorer nations, 
especially those in the neighboring Caribbean.  See, e.g., Field, supra note __ at 1242 (“even the Black 
Caucus was induced to speak out against the OECD plan, on the basis of solidarity with people of color 
living in Caribbean tax havens.”); Cordia Scott, “Congressional Black Caucus Says OECD Tax Move 
Unfairly Blasts Developing Nations,” 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 1600, 1600-01 (April 2, 2001) [hereinafter 
“Black Caucus”]. 
139 For example, the two founders of the CFP persuaded Antigua to “designate them as its official delegates 
to a January OECD summit with other Caribbean tax-haven countries in Barbados.” Cloud, supra note __ at 
A20.  
140 Michael M. Phillips, U.S. Weighs Backing Away From Effort to Crack Down on Tax-Haven Countries, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at A2) (quoting a senior Treasury official). 
141 After O’Neill’s statement, a “bipartisan group of tax commissioners suggest that Mr. O’Neill was 
misinformed about the purpose of the [tax competition] campaign,”  that “the project explicitly rejects 
harmonizing tax codes,” and that any effort to “unify tax rates would not work” given the variety of tax 
systems.  David Cay Johnston, “Former I.R.S. Chiefs Back Tax Haven Crackdown,”  N.Y.T., June 9, 2001, 
at C1. 
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types) and although the United States “backpedaled” on its attack on the project (and 
continued to support the project in what became a modified form), then end result was a 
tax competition effort mostly focused on information exchange and a “major retreat from 
the OECD’s original tax competition goals.”142
The story of the CFP’s lobbying and political efforts make a fascinating journey 
through politics, rhetoric, and interest groups.143  However, for purposes of this article the 
key element is how the CFP, and those they brought on board, used sovereignty 
arguments to challenge the OECD project.  To consider this question, we can look at 
three basic categories of writings: comments by the CFP and its affiliates; letters and 
comments by members of Congress; and statements and comments by other writers.  A 
review of these comments reveals three recurring themes to the sovereignty objections --  
(1) fiscal policy, (2) exclusion of some countries from decision making, and (3) colonial 
rule and redistribution.  The following analysis organizes the comments broadly along 
these lines.144
 
Fiscal Policy Objections 
In addition to their website mission statement, other CFP writings identify 
sovereignty as a major problem with the OECD project.  For example, in a 2000 piece in 
the Washington Times, Daniel Mitchell (co-founder of the CFP) critiqued the tax 
competition project, asking “by what right can a bunch of Paris-based bureaucrats dictate 
tax policy to sovereign nations that are not even members of the OECD. . . . The time has 
come for the United States to reassess its funding of the OECD. . . .[which is] 
undermining the sovereign right of nations to determine their own tax policies.”145  In a 
paper published two months later, Mitchell began by contending that the OECD “effort 
contradicts international norms and threatens the ability of sovereign countries to 
determine their own fiscal affairs.”146  Moreover, the OECD proposed “cartel would have 
adverse consequences for U.S. taxpayers and threaten national sovereignty, financial 
privacy, technological development and rule of law.”147  After discussing tax competition 
more broadly, and the OECD plans in more detail, the paper outlines a series of 
arguments as to why the OECD plan is undesirable.  Under the heading “Why the OECD 
Proposal is Misguided,” Mitchell again references sovereignty as well as other 
concerns.148  In the section entitled “An Attack on Sovereignty” Mitchell again states: 
                                                 
142 See, e.g., Field, supra note __ at  1243-1244. 
143 For broader discussion of the role of the CFP in the tax competition debate see, e.g., Easson, supra note 
__. 
144 It is valuable to bear in mind for all three case studies that the substantive significance of any particular 
asserted objection to sovereignty does not depend on the speaker’s motivation.  As Part I articulated, there 
are both functional and normative reasons to question the surrender of taxing powers by a sovereign state.  
A given speaker may tap, without conviction, those arguments and the intuitions that lay behind them to 
persuade others to adopt a policy desired by the speaker.  The speaker’s “self-interest” and lack of true 
commitment to underlying principles captured by the arguments do not diminish the actual arguments.  In 
fact, part of the reason these arguments might be selected is that they reflect a shared understanding and 
resonate with the audience. 
145 Daniel J. Mitchell, OECD War on Low-Tax Countries, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, at B1. 
146 Daniel J. Mitchell, “An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher Taxes and 
Less Privacy.” 21TAX NOTES INT’L 1799, 1799  (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter “Proposal”]. 
147 Id. at 1800. 
148 Id. at 1811-12. 
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[t]he OECD’s proposal would substantially interfere with the right of sovereign 
nations to determine their own tax policies. . . .  In effect, the OECD seeks to 
overturn 200 years of established international practice so that high tax nations 
can impose taxes on assets and activities outside their own territory.  
Traditionally, governments have used a ‘territorial’ or ‘source-based’ rule for 
taxation, allowing them to tax all incomes and activities within their borders.149  
 
The final paragraph of the paper concludes, “U.S. policymakers should reject the OECD 
initiative.  It is a threat to America’s national interests.  More important, it will be bad for 
U.S. taxpayers; it will undermine national sovereignty; it will destroy financial privacy; it 
will hinder technological innovation; it will lead to protectionism; and it will sabotage the 
rule of law.”150
Spurred on by lobbying efforts from the CFP, various members of Congress 
expressed their disapproval of the OECD tax competition project and subsequent 
international efforts to limit tax competition, and their letters typically referenced the 
rights of “sovereign nations” and the importance of sovereignty, particularly to fiscal 
policy.151  Examples include the following:  
 
(1) Letter from Dick Armey, Majority Leader in the House of 
Representatives: “[Instead of pursuing the OECD approach] the U.S. should shift 
entirely to a territorial system – the common sense notion that countries only tax 
income that is earned within their borders – and also eliminate the double taxation 
of income that is saved and invested.  This approach is consistent with sound tax 
policy, protects financial privacy, and preserves fiscal sovereignty.”  The letter 
concludes: “I look forward to working with you to stop the OECD’s initiative and 
to adopt instead, common-sense proposals that will maintain tax competition and 
the sovereignty of all nations.”152
 
(2) Letter from Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator: “This assault [the OECD 
initiative] on tax competition, financial privacy, and fiscal sovereignty is deeply 
flawed.  Tax competition is a liberalizing force in the world economy.  It restrains 
the growth of government and leads to lower tax rates.  Moreover, if nations 
(including the U.S.) shifted to territorial taxation, the entire justification for 
creating a global network of tax police would disappear, as would the justification 
for interfering with the right of sovereign nations to determine their own tax and 
privacy laws.”153
 
(3)  Letter from Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator: “It [the issue of tax 
competition and the OECD project] has important implications for individual 
                                                 
149 Id. at 1811. 
150 Id. at  1821. 
151 The CFP web site has a page devoted to listing and linking to these letters sent by Senators and 
Members of Congress to the Treasury Secretary objecting to the U.S. participation in the OECD tax 
competition project.  http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/congress/congress.shtml. 
152 Letter of Majority Leader Dick Armey to Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill (March 16, 2001). 
153 Letter of Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, (April 5, 2001). 
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freedom and national sovereignty. If implemented, the OECD initiative would 
require the wholesale elimination of financial privacy. The OECD also assumes 
that it has the right to dictate tax and privacy laws in non-member nations – and is 
threatening sovereign jurisdictions with sweeping financial protectionism if they 
do not change their laws to make it easier for high-tax nations to collect more tax 
revenue.”154
 
(4) Letter from Don Nickles, U.S. Senator: “Our relatively low-tax status has 
fueled economic growth and enabled our economy to draw investors and savings 
from many of our high-tax European competitors. Those competitors will 
eventually use the OECD initiative as a weapon to undermine our sovereign right 
to enact pro-growth tax policies.”155
 (5)   Letter from John Doolittle, U.S. Representative: “the Paris-based 
bureaucracy is demanding that low-tax nations change their tax and privacy laws 
so high-tax nations can tax income and assets on a worldwide basis. Low-tax 
countries that refuse to surrender their fiscal sovereignty and acquiesce to the 
OECD's demands are being threatened with financial protectionism.  Not 
surprisingly, the previous administration supported this egregious assault on the 
right of sovereign nations to determine their own fiscal policies. . . .We should 
pull the plug on the OECD initiative, not only because it is appropriate to defend 
the sovereign right of all nations to adopt free market policies, but also because 
we do not want to create a precedent that our high-tax competitors could use 
against America.”156
Exclusive Decision-making Objections 
The CFP and members of Congress certainly did not constitute the complete set 
of voices on tax competition and the OECD.  A range of other advocates addressed tax 
competition and the importance of sovereignty, and their comments reflected a general 
discomfort with the fact that the OECD (a predominantly developed country 
membership) met alone and determined the “rules” by which non-member countries 
should play.  Some of these writers were informally affiliated with the CFP, such as 
Bruce Zagaris, who has written frequently on the OECD and tax competition, and been a 
speaker at CFP events.157  In an April 2001 paper, Zagaris directly attacked the OECD 
plan on the grounds of U.S. sovereignty.  The paper, entitled “Application of OECD 
Harmful Tax Practices Criteria to the OECD Countries Shows Potential Dangers to U.S. 
                                                 
154 Letter of Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, (May 9, 2001). 
155 Letter of Don Nickles, U.S. Senator to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, (Feb. 6, 2001). 
156 Letter from John Doolittle, U.S. Representative, to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill (March 29, 
2001). 
157 For example, Mr. Zagaris, a tax lawyer with Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, spoke at the CFP briefings in 
Barbados in January 2001.  See CFP website 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/press/Barbados/bardos.shtml.  See also, Goulder, “Opposition,” 
supra note __ at 236-37.  Mr. Zagaris’ profile on the law firm website notes that  “[h]is private practice has 
also included monitoring international tax enforcement developments in the U.S. and the Caribbean for 
foreign governments and corporate clients” and extensively details his work in that area).  See 
http://www.bcr-dc.com/atty/bz.html.  
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Sovereignty,” reviews the OECD’s “Framework for a Collective Memorandum of 
Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices.”  Zagaris analyzes the various 
requirements that would be imposed under the Memorandum and identifies sovereignty 
conflicts.  For example, regarding the proposed “stand still” provision in the 
Memorandum (which would require countries to refrain from enacting any new regime 
that constitutes a harmful tax practice), he comments:  
[T]he constitutional provisions of most countries preclude their surrender of 
sovereign power to tax to an international organization, especially one of limited 
membership and authority such as the OECD.  As a general matter the stand-still 
provisions raise problems of potential violations of a signatory’s sovereignty and 
constitutional obligations.158  
 In other articles, Zagaris has also highlighted sovereignty concerns with the tax 
competition project: “The targeted countries have appropriately questioned the 
legitimacy, as a matter of public international law, of the efforts by the OECD and its 
members, which used propaganda and threatened sanctions to violate the absolute 
sovereignty of states over their fiscal affairs.”159  In the concluding paragraph, Zagaris 
presents the question as “whether [the Bush administration] wants to yield its own fiscal 
sovereignty to an international organization, such as the OECD, at a time when another 
international organization has already undercut the country’s ability to determine and 
employ its fiscal policy.”160  Academic writers also repeated objections grounded in the 
process by which the OECD reached its policies. For example, Kimberly Carlson notes 
that globalization inherently brings some loss of sovereignty but contends that “[a]ny 
sovereignty that is lost by signing worldwide trade agreements . . . is tolerable because it 
is only forfeited after an opportunity to negotiate.   By excluding non-OECD members in 
the analysis and by recommending coordinated defense measures, the OECD violates the 
sovereignty of those nations that it unilaterally deems tax havens. . . . .”161
Colonial Rule and Redistribution Objections 
The CFP’s written critique of the OECD project intertwines the sovereignty 
argument with poverty/race claims: “Today poorer nations are being told they cannot 
adopt similar policies in order to have an attractive investment climate – a demand that 
has been called an ‘infringement on their sovereignty by a group of rich white 
                                                 
158 Bruce Zagaris, “Application of OECD Harmful Tax Practices Criteria to the OECD Countries Shows 
Potential Dangers to U.S. Sovereignty,” at 16 available at 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Papers/bz04-25-01/bz04-25-01.PDF.  
159 Bruce Zagaris, “Issues Low-Tax Regimes Should Raise When Negotiating With the OECD,” 22 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 523, 524 (Jan. 29, 2001) [hereinafter “Negotiating”].  Zagaris also comments that “[i]f the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of OECD member countries are willing to undertake the same 
obligations, and to compromise their own sovereignty and revenue raising policy, at least the targeted 
countries will be able to approach the enjoyment of a level playing field.”  Id. at 530. 
160 Zagaris, “Negotiating,” supra note __ at 532 (presumably alluding to the United States’ dispute in the 
WTO over the foreign sales corporations rules). The foreign sales corporation rules form the basis of the 
third case study, see infra Part II.C. 
161 Kimberly Carlson, “When Cows Have Wings: An Analysis of the OECD’s Tax Haven Work As It 
Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and Privacy,” 35 MARSHALL L. REV. 163, 177-78 (2002). 
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nations.’”162  The letters sent to these tax havens by the OECD are described as “a stark 
example of the organization’s disregard for sovereignty.”163   
In addition to providing public commentary through newspapers and tax 
publications, the CFP maintained an active dialogue on its website, presented at seminars, 
issued press releases and statements on the OECD tax competition project, and 
“organized” many of the Caribbean havens.164  For example, CFP founders attended the 
24th Annual Conference on Caribbean and Latin American Economies, Dec. 5-7 
(2000).165  Mitchell spoke on behalf of the CFP at the Bahamas Bar Association in 
December 2000 (a trip which “followed a period during which several key Bahamian 
officials held consultative discussions with the OECD representatives.”).166 A few weeks 
later, the CFP held a symposium in Barbados on the OECD tax competition project; 
followed by a meeting in London in January.167  Then in late February 2001, the CFP had 
a meeting in Paris (just days before an OECD meeting).168  Although the OECD tax 
competition project was notably revised, as described earlier, the CFP has continued to 
actively advocate on the subject of tax competition.169
The CRP’s lobbying efforts in Congress also garnered the support of the 
Congressional Black caucus, which sent a letter (signed by twenty six of the thirty eight 
members of the caucus) to Secretary of Treasury O’Neill objecting to the OECD project.  
The letter notes in part: (1) This issue “will undermine the ability of developing nations 
and one of our own territories to strengthen and diversify their economies and reduce 
poverty;” (2) “This initiative threatens to undermine the fragile economies of some of our 
closest neighbors and allies;” (3) “[T]he initiative will impose serious economic harm on 
developing nations;” and (4) “We ask you to reject the OECD’s misguided initiative.  In 
doing so, we will be protecting our own interests and also protecting the interests of less 
fortunate nations around the world.”170
Other writers, including those from legal academia, have questioned the 
sovereignty implications for tax havens of the OECD project.  For example, Vaughn E. 
James in an article entitled “Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM 
                                                 
162 Mitchell, “The Proposal,” supra note [145] at 1812. (citations omitted). 
163  Id. at 1812. 
164 See supra note [139]. 
165 See, e.g., Goulder, supra note __ at 2653 (describing CFP planned action at the 24th Annual Conference 
on Caribbean and Latin American Economies, Dec. 5-7 (2000)). 
166 “CFP’s Mitchell Warns Bahamas Against OECD Cooperation,” 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 157, 157 (Jan, 8, 
2001). 
167 Robert Goulder, “U.S. Congressional Staffer: Opposition to OECD Tax Haven Campaign May Be 
Growing in Washington,” 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 236, 236-37 (Jan. 15, 2001) [hereinafter “Opposition”]; 
Trevor Drury, “Center for Freedom and Prosperity Meets in Paris,” 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 1201, 1201 (Mar. 
12, 2001) [hereinafter “Paris”]; Robert Goulder, “OECD Tax Haven Working Group Meets in London,” 22 
TAX NOTES INT’L 587, 587 (Feb. 5, 2001). 
168 Drury, “Paris,” supra note __ at 587. 
169 For example, in 2007, the CFP website lists tax competition as the first topic on its “IssueWatch” page: 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/issues/issues.shtml.  It also has a “tax competition” dedicated web 
page: http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/publications/publications.shtml. 
170 “Congressional Black Caucus Letter to Treasury Secretary O’Neill Against OECD Tax Initiative,” 
2001-TNT 59-23 (Mar. 14, 2001).  See also supra note [138]. 
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Countries of their Tax and Economic Policy Sovereignty,”171 contends “that 
notwithstanding the revised U.S. position [on the OECD Tax Competition project], 
CARICOM nations have had to effectively surrender their sovereignty on tax and 
economic policy to the OECD.”172  This characterization of the tax competition debate 
mimics the objections raised by developing countries to expropriation rules which they 
felt had been imposed upon them by more powerful nations. Similarly, in a 2004 article, 
Michael Littlewood implicitly accepts the allegation that the OECD efforts constitute an 
infringement of tax havens’ sovereignty and focuses initially on whether the problems 
caused by the tax havens’ behavior warrant that type of response.173  Later in the article 
Littlewood flips the sovereignty argument to make it both a pro and a con, suggesting that 
the question is one of “semantics” because:  
For a country, or group of countries, to dictate another country’s tax policy 
is, in a sense, a violation of sovereignty.  On the other hand, if the tax havens are 
free to structure their tax systems however they wish, why not the OECD Member 
States?  That is, if the tax havens are free to structure their tax systems so as to 
facilitate the avoidance of other countries’ taxes, it seems to follow that other 
countries should be free to structure their tax system so as to discourage the use of 
havens [e.g., by disallowing deductions to haven entities, levying withholding 
taxes on payments to haven residents, and withholding “nonessential” aid].  
Conversely, if there are limits on the OECD States’ freedom to structure their tax 
systems however they wish, such restrictions presumably apply to havens also.  
                                                 
171 Vaughn E. James, “Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM Countries of their Tax and Economic Policy 
Sovereignty,” 34 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 28, 32, 39 (2002). 
172 Id. at 5.  James also quotes arguments made by A. Townsend, in 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 215, 252 
(2001) that the OECD's "efforts to curb tax competition marks a substantial deviation from the treaty 
network established to address international fiscal problems and usurps a basic tenet of fiscal legislation: 
national sovereignty."  James, supra note __ at 28.  Still other authors characterize the OECD effort as one 
that strips havens of their sovereignty: “The OECD scheme would encourage the world's major economies 
to penalize 41 low-tax countries and territories for maintaining attractively low rates unless they essentially 
relinquish their fiscal sovereignty.  It also would institutionalize the exchange of financial information 
across international borders to help tax authorities chase their citizens' assets around the globe. This 
common criticism touches upon the concepts of globalization, sovereignty and privacy.”  Carlson, supra 
note __ at 172.  Carlson also urges that “[e]every nation has a right to operate its own tax regimes and 
should not need to put its economy, which is primarily based on the offshore investment market, at risk to 
ensure that taxing giants maintain their imprisoned tax base.” Id. at 177-178.  Ultimately, Carlson argues 
that the United Nations is a better forum in which to handle tax haven issues precisely because of its view 
of sovereignty: “The United Nations emphasizes the sovereignty of its members . . . . This global presence 
would encourage the cooperation necessary to effectively address international tax related issues while 
maintaining the sovereignty rights of all who would be affected.”  Id. at 186.
173 Michael Littlewood, “Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?,” 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 441 (2004) 
(“Another charge routinely made against tax havens is that they facilitate the money-laundering activities 
of drug dealers, gun runners, terrorists, and so on.  A number of havens appear, indeed to be guilty.  
Conduct of this kind seems a more compelling reason for countries affected to violate the sovereignty of 
the haven facilitating.  It does not follow, though, that the havens should reform their tax systems. [Other 
changes may be more appropriate.]”). 
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Similarly, it seems difficult to categorize the withholding of aid as a violation of 
sovereignty.174   
Summary:  Sovereignty was used as a frequent refrain in critiques by a variety of 
commentators on the U.S. participation in tax competition.  As a general matter, the 
connection between sovereignty and taxation was presumed and required no explanation, 
simply a “reminder.”  To that degree, the usage indicates the existence of a fairly 
universal link between the two that can be tapped, simply as a rhetorical matter.  Even the 
Secretary of the Treasury, when de facto expressing a change in U.S. support for the 
OECD plan, enunciated sovereignty concerns.175  One of the authors, though, did devote 
some attention to specifying the connection between sovereignty and taxation.  The core 
observation was that taxation has traditionally been a central power of the sovereign: 
“Taxation and the sovereign’s absolute right to tax its subjects have their origins ‘in 
antiquity.’ The right to tax forms one of the most intimate relationships between the 
sovereign and its subjects.”176  Correspondingly, outside efforts to constrain a state’s 
taxing powers attack this sovereignty: “The decision to tax or not to tax and the manner 
in which to tax within domestic borders is one that has always been within the absolute 
discretion of each sovereign. . . . By using a state’s method of taxation as a determinative 
factor, The [OECD] Report impinges upon territorial sovereignty, an act otherwise 
violative of international law and long-standing international doctrines.”177
To the extent that critics of the OECD expounded upon their sovereignty 
arguments, a number of themes emerged.  First, the functional role of taxation (in 
particular, the fiscal policy dimensions of sovereignty) regularly surfaced in these 
analyses and statements.  The CFP repeatedly objected to the states’ loss of ability to 
“determine their own tax policies,”178 members of Congress noted the values of fiscal 
sovereignty,179 and academic writers described a loss of “sovereignty on tax and 
economic policy to the OECD.”180  It is interesting that the functional role of tax 
sovereignty advocated in the tax competition debate does not focus on revenue.  
Presumably that decision reflects the reality that the states’ strongly pressing the 
sovereignty argument (the havens) are not using their policies to collect substantial tax 
                                                 
174 Littlewood, supra note __ at 480. 
175 See, e.g., text accompanying note __ []Treasury Official stating that the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
evaluating the OECD plan would “respect the sovereignty” of tax systems]; and text accompanying note [in 
announcing the U.S. pull-back, the Secretary of the Treasury objected to “efforts to dictate to any country 
what its own tax rates or tax system should be.”] 
176 George M. Melo, “Taxation in the Global Arena: Preventing The Erosion of National Tax Bases or 
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177 Id. at 200. 
178  Mitchell,  “Proposal,” supra note __ at 1811. 
179 See, e.g., Letter of Majority Leader Dick Armey to Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill (March 16, 
2001); Letter from John Doolittle, U.S. Representative, to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill (March 29, 
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180 Vaughn E. James, supra note __ at 5.  See also, id. at 28 (quoting arguments made by A. Townsend), 
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revenues and that some of the other vociferous advocates of haven sovereignty support a 
world with little or no tax.181
A second argument raised on behalf of havens hints loosely at some of the 
democracy arguments by contending that “the OECD violate[d] the sovereignty of those 
nations that it unilaterally deems tax havens” both “[b]y excluding non-OECD members 
in the analysis and by recommending coordinated defense measures.”182  To the extent 
that the havens viewed their tax policy as de facto set by the OECD, the resulting 
outcomes would not reflect a democratic process in which they participated.  Thus, the 
“democracy problems” would extend beyond the quality of accountability and 
transparency in the OECD– these elements would be entirely absent with respect to the 
havens.  One commentator specifically asserts that “the United Nations is a better forum 
in which to handle tax haven issues,” noting its commitment to granting all members 
regardless of size, wealth, and political system both a voice and a vote.183  I would not, 
though, overstate the centrality of theoretical democracy concerns to the tax competition 
debate.  To be sure, the havens perceived the OECD action, taken without their 
consultation, as a complete loss of voice.  However, unlike the case of the EU, taken up 
below, where a significant literature has developed on the problems of a democratic 
deficit and its implications for supra-state entities and for structure and procedure in the 
EU, the tax competition debate constituted a head-to-head clash between two groups of 
states striving to exercise their tax sovereignty. 
A third set of themes appearing across the comments of the CFP, the 
Congressional Black Caucus, and some academics challenged the impact of the OECD 
plan on tax havens that are developing countries.  Their arguments, perhaps made with 
varying degrees of commitment,184 question both the power and the racial disparities 
involved.  The references to “white nations”185 and the concern for and solidarity with 
“people of color living in Caribbean tax havens,”186 
especially when combined with claims that the havens are only trying to do now 
(compete with taxes) what these other states have done for years,187 harkens back to the 
stance on sovereignty made by former colonies when defending expropriation as a 
righteous response to their economic position following colonial rule. 
The related emphasis on the havens’ status as “poorer nations”188 implicitly 
suggests a special duty for the rich nations to the poor, akin to the ideas of inter-nation 
equity.  The critics do not elaborate upon the implications of the rich/poor imagery (it is 
intended to enhance the unseemly quality of the OECD nations’ trespass upon the poorer 
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184 Mitchell’s (and the CFP’s ) expression of concern for “the poorer nations” concluded by characterizing 
the OECD project as “a threat to America’s national interests” and as “bad for U.S. taxpayers.”  Mitchell, 
“Proposal,” supra note __ at 1812, 1821 (emphasis added). 
185 Mitchell, “Proposal,” supra note __ at 1812. 
186 Field, supra note __ at 1242 (discussing the stance of the Black caucus on the OECD plan). 
187 Mitchell, “Proposal,” supra note __ at 1812. 
188 Id; see also Scott, “Black Caucus,” supra note __ at 1600-01. 
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nations’ sovereignty).  However, when combined with Littlewood’s recognition that tax 
competition arguably involves competing sovereignty claims189 (a point not 
acknowledged by most of the commentators), the identification of some nations as 





Finally, it is useful to observe that in the tax competition debate, the sovereignty 
claim typically was joined by an underlying objection to the substance of the tax 
competition project and the perceived impact on effective tax rates.  Many comments 
demonstrated at strong preference for low tax rates, and a corresponding belief that the 
OECD project would lead to high tax rates.  (Whether that was likely or desirable is a 
separate question).191 This attention in the critiques to the undesirability of the possible 
tax effects should be no surprise.  The primary sovereignty justification asserted in most 
of the comments involved “fiscal sovereignty” and the right to dictate your own tax 
policy.  If the actions of other states could force your state to shift tax policy you may be 
outraged on general principles of sovereignty, but you will be especially outraged if their 
actions will lead to policies you reject. 
 
Although all of the quoted passages on the OECD plan directly employed the language of 
sovereignty and expected it to carry significant weight on its own, the passages also 
revealed some underlying objection based on fiscal control, the nature of the decision-
making process, and the perceived desirability of the resulting substantive tax policy.  
Perhaps because authors of the quoted passages almost uniformly objected to the actual 
effects of the plans, they made no acknowledgement of the “counter” sovereignty 
argument (other than Littlewood, an academic writer).  But why not characterize the 
OECD plan as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the participating states?  If the haven 
states have a sovereign right to use their tax systems as they are (including potentially the 
United States), then cannot the same be said for the OECD countries?192  Without 
                                                 
189 Littlewood, supra note __ at 480. 
190 One could argue that the tax policy actions of the OECD and the havens are not comparable by: (1) 
describing the haven tax policy as one which takes the other nations’ tax rules and policies as a given and 
then designs its own, and  (2) describing the OECD policy as on which seeks to change the practices of the 
other (haven) states.  According to this line of argument the havens are respecting the OECD nations’ 
sovereignty (and not trying to force changes), whereas the OECD states are coercing change to haven 
policy and thus disregarding their sovereignty.  This entire line of argument, however, relies on whether the 
“undermining” of a nation’s tax policy occurs through intentional, “forced” change in policy.  This focus 
misses the more significant point – both the tax havens and the OECD states want to prevent the “other” 
from achieving its desired tax policy goals [OECD wants to collect tax; the havens want to facilitate the 
payment of no tax]  -- and both act accordingly. 
191 This rate fear seems linked in part to “anti-big government” views: if you desire small government, you 
should provide it little revenue.  See, e.g., text accompanying note  [letter from 22 US representatives].  
Also characterizing the OECD by the phrase “Paris-based bureaucrats” seems to provide fuel for both the 
basic sovereignty rhetoric and for the low tax-small government message.  See, e.g., text accompanying 
note [U.S. rep. Doolittle; Mitchell in CFP comments). 
192 Even if one acknowledged that the OECD plan could be viewed as an exercise of its members own 
sovereignty, there could nonetheless be challenges to the plan on other grounds.  For example, see the 
arguments raised by Karen Brown regarding the lack of participation of developing countries in the OECD 
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recognition of the OECD states’ sovereignty arguments, the problem of balancing 
competing sovereignty claims has yet to surface in the tax competition debate.  
 
B. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS OVER TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Whatever might be the sensitivity of states in general to potential incursions into 
their “tax sovereignty,” one could imagine the members of the EU might be different.  
They are states that have come together voluntarily to create a rather unique193 level of 
interdependence, while maintaining their individual “sovereign” state status.194  
However, an inquiry into EU tax policy and procedure, and into the sentiments expressed 
on issues of taxation reveals that taxation remains hotly contested and sovereignty a 
frequent concern.195  After providing a brief overview of the structure of the EU and its 
provisions on taxation, this section then looks at sovereignty concerns expressed by 
member states and others on tax voting rules and on the specific issue of corporation 
taxation.196
 
EUROPEAN UNION BACKGROUND 
 Although some concept of "Europe" and a greater European organization has 
existed for over 600 years, the push for an effective European union did not take shape 
until the end of WWII.197  With two catastrophic wars in the first half of the 20th century, 
the post-war climate was critical of the Westphalia system of independence and 
sovereignty.198  Westphalia's objectives of peace and prosperity were clearly not 
achieved, and the opposite, war and hardship, seemed to result.199 By 1944, some groups 
in Europe believed that an "irrevocable surrender" of sovereign rights in the areas of 
defense and foreign relations was essential to lasting peace.200
 Proposals for a new European system ranged from the radical (e.g., Altiero 
Spinelli's idea of the complete abolition of independent states) to the more moderate (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                 
plan, the distinct financial situation and needs of developing countries, and the limited options of 
developing countries.  Brown, supra note __ at 312-315, 323. 
193 Efforts to describe they type of “federalism” in the EU quickly result in a determination that its structure 
is not like that of other forms of federalism (e.g., U.S., Canada). 
194 See, e.g., Marcel Gerard, “The Challenge of Taxing Multijurisdictional Companies in Europe,” 40 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1169, 1169 (Dec. 26, 2005) (noting that “the European Unions is not quite a collection of 
sovereign states, nor is it yet a federal state”). 
195 Perhaps, a counter-intuition could be offered: having relinquished so many “traditional” sovereign  
powers, the EU member states cling tenaciously to taxation as one of their core remaining powers. 
196 Debates in the EU over taxation and sovereignty are certainly not limited to these topics.  See, e.g., 
Clemens Fuest, Thomas Hemmelgarn, & Fred Ramb, “The Tax Revenue Implications of Marks & Spencer 
for Germany,” 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 763, 763 (May 30, 2005) (“In principle, the EC Treaty grants full 
sovereignty to member states in direct tax matters.  But recently, national tax systems have increasingly 
been challenged by rulings of the ECJ.”). 
197 Sir William Nicoll & Trevor C. Salmon, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 4, 7-9 (2001). 
198 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 7 (“The system created after the Treaty of Westphalia system in 1648, 
which had ended the Thirty Years’ War but which also laid the basis for the sovereign state system in 
Europe, had now demonstrably failed to maintain international order, peace and security. . . .”). 
199 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 7. 
200 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 8 (quoting Some Members of the Resistance Groups in Europe, ‘Draft 
Declaration II on European Federation,’ in W. Eichler, Europe Speaks, Militant Socialist International, 
1944). 
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Jean Monnet's concepts of "collective action" and "coordinated war efforts").201  
Monnet's ideas became the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),202 
a system of pooled production which laid the basic structure for all future European 
integration.203  By the end of the decade (1957), a number of countries signed the Treaty 
of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), frequently known as 
the common market, which sought to provide a broader economic union that could both 
prevent war and promote prosperity.204  In addition, the second Treaty of Rome (1957) 
established the European Atomic Energy Community (known as Euroatom) which 
focused on pooling resources in Europe for the development of a nuclear energy industry 
(with exclusively civil functions) that could potentially provide energy independence.205  
Ultimately, by 1990s the EU system expanded to include social rights and other not 
strictly economic goals.206  The Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) of 
1992 not only unified the three former communities of Euroatom, the EEC and the 
ECSC; but it also established cooperation on important non-economic issues including 
foreign policy, defense, and justice.207
                                                 
201 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 8-9. 
202 The stated purpose of the ECSC was to “contribute, in harmony with the general economy of the 
Member States and through the establishment of a common market, to economic expansion, growth of 
employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States.”  Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, Art. 2. 
203 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 9, 14-15;  European Union Website at http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-
1959/index_en.htm.  The website also characterizes the ECSC as “the first step towards a supranational 
Europe.” Shortly after the ECSC’s formation under the Treaty of Paris of 1951, commentators considered 
the longer term implications of the changes to sovereign status under the states’ new relationship.  
Raymond, Vernon, “The Schuman Plan: Sovereign Powers of the European Coal and Steel Community,” 
47 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 183 passim  (1953) 
204  See, e.g., Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 17-20; European Union website at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm.  
205 See, e.g., European Union website, available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm; 
Nicoll & Salmon, note _ at 18-21. 
206 Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 52. 
207 Nicoll & Salmon, note __, at 352-354, 359.  The new structure was built on the concept of “three 
pillars”: (1) the European Communities (the economic dimension formally labeled the EEC and changed to 
the EC); (2) the Common Foreign Policy and Security policy pillar, under the acronym CFSP; and (3) the 
police and justice pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  The treaty also set in motion the EMU 
(economic and monetary union).   Subsequent treaties continued this process (Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 
and the Treaty of Nice in 2001).  In 2004, the EU took a significant step in signing the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe, replacing with a single document all prior treaties (except the Euroatom Treaty).  
See Protocol 36, of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en03910394.pdf.   See also 
http://europe.ue/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.html.  However, ratification by the member states was required for 
this to take effect.  Although many states did ratify the Treaty, France and the Netherlands rejected the 
Treaty in their national referenda, thereby derailing the process and hopes for implementation.  See, e.g., 
Christopher Caldwell, Why Did the French and Dutch Vote No? Because They Were Asked, For A Change,  
THE WEEKLY STANDARD, June 13, 2005, Features, Vol. 10, no. 37; Ralph Atkins, Ian Bickerton, and 
George Parker, Dutch Deal a Further Blow to EU Treaty” FINANCIAL TIMES, June 2, 2005, Sec. 1 at 1.  In 
June 2007, the EU members began pursuing a Reform Treaty, to replace the failed Constitutional Treaty.  
See, e.g., George Parker, EU Rushes to Get New Treaty Set in Stone, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 27, 2007, 
London Edition 1, World News at. 8; Ian Bickerton, James Blitz & Tobias Buck, EU ‘Emerges From 
Paralysis’ With Breakthrough Constitution Treaty, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 25, 2007) U.S. Edition 2, Sec. 1 
at 1. 
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 In the words of the European Union's website, the EU today is "a family of 
democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and 
prosperity."208  More specifically it is a set of "common institutions to which [member 
countries] delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint 
interest can be made democratically at [the] European level."209
 
EU DECISION-MAKING 
 Decision-making procedures in the EU vary widely depending on the issue and 
the governing body.  Due to their complexity and dynamic nature, these procedures 
cannot be reduced to a simple summary.210   However, for purposes of this article, key 
features include the difference between the two primary voting methods, (qualified 
majority voting (QMV) and unanimous voting) and the explanations for when each is 
used.   
 The main decision-making body in the EU is the Council of the European Union 
(the Council) which represents the member states.211  All member states are represented, 
and their number of votes is based on population although the allocation of votes is 
weighted in favor of countries with smaller populations.212  Currently the total number of 
votes on the Council stands at 345.  For most decisions, the Council uses QMV, under 
which the requisite majority in the Council is reached if: (1) 255 out of the 345 possible 
votes are cast favorably, and (2) a majority (sometimes a 2/3 majority) of member states 
approve.  In addition, member states can request confirmation that the majority represents 
at least 62% of the total EU population.213  Over the years, QMV has been extended to a 
broader number of topics.214  
Areas not subject to QMV require unanimous votes. Although the trend is for 
more areas to use QMV, many issues still require unanimous votes including foreign 
                                                 
208  European Union Website available at http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_en.htm.  
209 Id.  The site also asserts that “[i]t is not a State intending to replace existing states, but is bigger than any 
other international organization.”  Id.  
210 See generally John Peterson & Elizabeth Bomberg, DECISION-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999); 
Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 79-173. 
211 See, e.g., European Union website at http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm.   See also, 
Peterson & Bromberg, note __  at 33-34.  In contrast to the Council, where each State has a minister to 
represent that state’s interests; the European Parliament is elected by the citizens of the EU to represent 
them.  See, e.g., European Union website at http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm.; 
Peterson & Bromberg, note __ at 33, 43-44. Parliament’s role varies depending on the topic involved.  For 
matters of taxation, Parliament acts in a consulting role. See  
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/tax_policy/index_en.htm. (“The EC Treaty, under 
Article 93, specifically provides for the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, to adopt provisions 
for the harmonization of Member States' rules in the area of indirect taxation (principally Value Added Tax 
and Excise Duties) . . . . As far as other taxes are concerned, Article 94 provides for the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, to adopt provisions for the approximation of such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market.”) 
212 See EU website, available at http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm.  
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., Peterson & Bomberg, note  __ at 48 (discussing the impact of the Single European Act of 1987 
which greatly expanded the role for QMV); Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 36 (same). 
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policy and defense, EU membership applications, election rules, and taxation.215  The 
topics needing a unanimous vote have been characterized as “particularly sensitive 
areas.”216  The need for unanimous decision-making in certain areas can be traced back to 
the infancy of what has become the EU, and can be seen as a national veto on matters that 
an individual state deems important.217  Even the failed EU Constitutional Treaty, which 
sought to increase EU “unification” in a variety of ways,218 intended to reserve certain 
matters for unanimous voting, including taxation, harmonization of social security, 
foreign policy and defense, membership, and citizenship.219
 
EU TAX POLICY: BASIC TAXING AUTHORITY AND THE EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE 
THE CORPORATE TAX BASE 
The sovereignty debate simmering in the EU, over taxation voting rules and over 
efforts to harmonize the corporate tax base, represents a case study of the tensions states 
face in deciding whether to surrender sovereignty to a multilateral body.  These tensions 
reflect several different sovereignty based concerns.  Some concerns mirror those found 
in the first case study (e.g., fiscal control and revenue), and some arise at this stage of 
multilateral interaction where there is not immediate conflict but rather the contemplation 
of the risks of shifting decision-making power up to the chain (democracy and local 
culture concerns).  The following analysis of comments and positions on the prospect of 
increased EU power in taxation tracks these basic categories.  
Fiscal Control and Revenue 
As noted above, tax matters continue to be subject to unanimous voting 
requirements in the EU.  But what tax issues are taken up by the EU, as opposed to the 
member states themselves?  Direct taxation in the EU has been, and continues to be, a 
national affair not subject to formal EU rules,220 although if “the single market, free 
movement of capital or individuals’ rights are being undermined by tax rules, the 
                                                 
215 See, e.g., Nicoll & Salmon, note __ at 555-556;  
216 EU website, available at http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm.  
217 Nicolls & Salmon, note __ at 25. 
218 The Constitutional Treaty would have switched some issues to QMV and added some new articles that 
would be subject to QMV.  For three special articles (on free movement/social security; judicial 
cooperation, and definition of crimes), QMV was specified, but with an “emergency brake” that would 
allow a member state to pursue an appeal of the issue with the European Council.  See E.U. website 
available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/majority_en.htm. 
219 See EU website, available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/majority_en.htm.  
220 “More obstacles arise from the lack of a strong legal basis to harmonize direct taxes.  Unlike with 
indirect taxes expressly covered by article 93, the EC Treaty has no provision that would directly allow the 
European Commission and the EU Council to harmonize corporate tax rates.  Instead, an indirect and 
general legal basis is used under article 94.”  Michal Niznik, “EU Corporate Tax Harmonization: Road to 
Nowhere?” 44 TAX NOTES INT’L 975, 976 (Dec. 18, 2006).  See also Nicolls & Salmon, note __ at 244.  
Although [e]ach member state of the European Union retains its sovereignty on matters concerning direct 
taxation . . . . In many decisions, the ECJ has held that any exercise of that sovereignty by a member state 
must take account of the fundamental freedoms conferred by the founding treaties of the European Union, 
which have direct effect in each member state and in Iceland and Norway, the two European Economic 
Area states that are not member’s states.” Michael McGowan, “U.K. Restrictions on the Use of Dual 
Consolidated Losses,” 33 TAX NOTES INT’L 903, 907 (Mar. 8, 2004) 
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European Court of Justice” will step in.221  Indirect taxes, however, including excise and 
turnover taxes, are required to be harmonized "to the extent necessary to sustain the 
Single Market."222 Harmonization does not necessarily mean standardization, as 
illustrated by divergent VAT rates despite the existence of a formal "directive" on the 
subject.223  As the EU explains: "There is EU-wide agreement on a minimum rate of 15% 
for VAT on most goods and services, but exceptions are possible. A higher standard rate 
is allowed within certain limits. So are lower rates, and exemptions for some items."224  
Harmonization of direct taxes is highly unlikely in the EU in the foreseeable 
future. As one EU ambassador put it, "tax harmonization is not going to take place. . . it 
all comes down to QMV versus unanimity. It is all that matters."225  One recent attempt 
at harmonizing a specific area of European taxes illustrates these tensions.  Corporations 
operating in multiple countries in the EU currently face a variety of national tax rules in 
defining their income tax base.  Over the years, the EU directed attention to this issue and 
floated a number of possibilities.226  In 2001, the European Commission issued a report 
on how to achieve an internal market without “tax obstacles.”227  One of the reviewed 
methods – common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)228 – became the subject of 
a working group.  In 2005, business groups were invited to participate in the working 
group process, and in May 2007, further meetings took place with the aim of “lay[ing] 
the groundwork for proposing a common consolidated corporate tax base . . . in the EU in 
2008 with eventual implementation by 2011.”229  The fact that this much progress has 
been made on the CCCTB proposal reveals that there is a significant amount of support 
for the plan.230  But significant, even majority, support is not enough.231  Although 
France and Germany support the plan (arguably in an effort to protect their higher tax 
                                                 
221 EU website available at : http://europa.eu/pol/tax/print_overview_en.htm (EU overview statement on 
taxation); see also id. At http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s10000.htm (outlining EU tax treatment in more 
detail).  See also Ruth Mason, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 22 (2005). 
222 Nicoll & Salmon, note _ at 243; see also EU website, available at: 
http://europa.eu/pol/tax/print_overview_en.htm.  
223 Nicoll & Salmon, note _ at 243;  see also EU website, available at: 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l31005.htm.  
224 See id. At http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l31006.htm.  
225 Peterson & Bomberg, note __ at 63. 
226 See, e.g., Vireo Certain & Silvia Guanine, “Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational 
Business Profits and Tax Coordination, 31 TAX NOTES INT'L 973, 980-88 (Sept. 15, 2003). 
227 Joann M. Weiner, “Approaching an EU Common Consolidated Tax Base, 46 TAX NOTES INT’L 647, 647 
(May 14, 2007) [hereinafter “Base”]; see also Niznik, supra note __ at 982-983. 
228 A CCCTB would “involve[] the creation of a common corporate tax base for all EU multinationals 
opting for the system.  Domestic companies and multinationals that do not join this regime will continue to 
be taxed under the current national tax systems based on separate accounting.”  Niznik, supra note __ at 
983 (citing Sorensen).  The goal is to “allow companies to consolidate their EU-wide profits using a single 
tax base set of rules and a uniform apportionment formula to divide the profits among the member states.” 
Id. at 983. 
229 Weiner, “Base,” supra  note __ at 647. 
230 Id. at 647 (reviewing various expressions of support by economic and finance ministers). 
231 Id.  As of March 2007, the EU Tax Commissioner indicated that 12 member states indicated strong 
support for CCCTB (including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain); 8 members indicated 
“cautious support” and seven states “expressed concern about or opposition to the CCCTB” (including 
Ireland and the U.K “which reject the plan outright, saying it would infringe on national sovereignty.”).  
Chuck Gnaedinger and Lisa Nadal, “Kovacs Optimistic on Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, 
114 TAX NOTES 990, 990 (March 12, 2007). 
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regimes from the competitive rates of EU newcomers), other countries have been quite 
hostile to the plan.232 England, for example, has expressed concern that the plan would 
hurt the EU's ability to compete for business globally.233  One tax lawyer in England 
commented that "the tax base prevents the finance minister in each member country from 
managing the economy in the ways that they feel appropriate"234  A tax lawyer in Ireland 
commented that "the tax base would undermine Ireland's national sovereignty over tax 
matters."235  
More generally, while law on direct tax harmonization has been unattainable, 
"soft law" has been used to some effect.236 In 1996, European finance ministers agreed 
on a non-binding resolution to discourage excessive tax competition among EU countries. 
(Although tax competition is a different problem from the CCCTB, these issues are all 
intertwined.  One of the concerns with CCCTB is that it will lead to harmonization of 
rates and a de facto attack on tax competition, a step not supported by all EU members).  
The resolution tiptoes around issues of sovereignty stating that it is "a political 
commitment and does not affect the Member States' rights and obligations or the 
respective spheres of competence of the Member States."237
As these issues of control over taxation have been debated, whether in the most 
direct form (the EU voting standard) or in the more circumspect context (e.g., the 
CCCTB),238 a variety of fiscal sovereignty arguments emerged.  Despite sharing a higher 
degree of unity (through the EU treaties) than most other nations, the EU members have 
not hesitated to articulate their sovereignty objection on these tax matters.  The following 
list provides a good sampling of these statements 
: 
(1) Irish views on the EU and taxation: 
(a) Business sector:  The CCCTB would increase Irish businesses’ taxes 
either because more income would be subject to tax outside of Ireland, 
or because Ireland would have to raise its tax rates to provide 
offsetting revenue “which would come close to an attack on our 
sovereignty. . . . A further concern [is] whether this [the CCCTB] is a 
first step towards tax rate harmonization. . . . Member states must 
                                                 
232 See text accompanying notes ___. 
233 INT'L TAX REV.,  Feb. 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4513754. 
234 INT’L TAX REV., May 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10913853. 
235 INT’L TAX REV., May 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10913853. 
236 See, e.g., Nicolls & Salmon, supra note __ at 246.  Note that soft law is not the only alternative to a 
formal vote that passes through the Council.  In the context of the CCCTB, the EU Tax Commissioner, 
Laszlo Kovacs has indicated that the “enhanced cooperation” option would be available as a way to 
implement CCCTB should it fail to obtain unanimous support.  Under enhanced cooperation (which has 
several threshold requirements), a subgroup of member states can adopt EU legislation. Gnaedinger & 
Nadal, supra note __ at 990. 
237 Nicolls & Salmon, supra note __ at 245. 
238  Recall that the CCCTB is advocated as a solution that will provide more a streamlined and efficient 
mechanism for taxing across the E.U. borders.  Gnaedinger & Nadal, supra note __ at 933 (idea for 
corporate tax base harmonization and the CCCTB grew out of complaints by corporate taxpayers that they 
faced high compliance costs when dealing with multiple taxing jurisdictions in the EU). 
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maintain their sovereignty over tax issues and retain their ability to 
adopt policies suitable to their needs.”239 
 
(b) Irish Minister of Finance: “One of the key components of a state’s 
expression of sovereignty is the right to determine the level of 
expenditure and the tax rates and structures required to support it. . . . 
This is a basic part of the democratic process. . . . By having unanimity 
in taxation matters, we can reach decisions which reflect the concerns 
and core interests of every member state.”240 
(2) U.K: 
 
(a) British government:  “We have been very clear – nothing on tax.  Tax 
is the province of the national states.. . . Anything to do with tax is 
about sovereignty, and the Treasury must have control over how and 
what is collected.”241 
 
(3) France: 
(a) Chair of the European Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Bruno Gibert, 
speaking from the French perspective: “Sovereignty and tax are very 
linked.  It dates back to the way we built our democracy . . . on a 
revolution . . . against the way taxes were levied. France in 1789 was 
clearly started on tax issues.  So parliamentary control on taxes is very 
deeply rooted in people’s minds.”242 
 
(4) General:  
(a) Austria’s goal of encouraging EU tax harmonization “won’t be easy . . 
. because any agreement will necessarily involve important issues of 
national sovereignty.  Monetary and fiscal policies are considered 
fundamental to national sovereignty.  With the introduction of the 
euro, responsibility for monetary policy will no longer reside with 
national governments – that will be the responsibility of the European 
Central Bank after Jan. 1, 1999.  This leaves fiscal policy, and 
governments aren’t in any great hurry to lose control over that as 
well.”243 
 
                                                 
239 Turlough O’Sullivan, “EU Tax Policy is Bad News for Business,” IRISH TIMES, June 8, 2007, Finance 
Section at 14 (article by the director general of the Irish Business and Employers Confederation). 
240 “Should Ireland Agree to Phasing Out the Veto on Taxation Voting?, IRISH TIMES, April 10, 2003,  
Opin. Sec. at 16 (quoting Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy). 
241 Eileen O’Grady, “United Kingdom Holds Its Ground In Opposing EU Tax Harmony,” 31 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1121, 1122 (Sept. 29, 2003) (quoting a British government spokesperson in Brussels). 
242 European Competitiveness Roundtable: Competition View with Common Base, INT’L TAX REV., Dec. 1, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 23404159 (Bruno Gibert, Chairman of the European Joint Transfer Pricing 
Forum, speaking at a roundtable). 
243 Alex Goldsborough, “Firms Throughout Europe Focus Sights on a Single Corporate Tax Structure,” 
W.S.J., April 20, 1998, Sec. B 11. 
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(b)  “In principle, too, taxation should be a matter of national sovereignty.  
Elections are often fought over how to tax, and how to spend the 
money that is raised. . . . It is unsurprising, therefore, that several 
member states, old and new, do not support any move to extend 
[QMV] to the area of taxation.”244 
 
(c)  “Anything to do with tax is about sovereignty, and the Treasury must 
have control over how and what is collected.  The Commission talks 
about moving to majority voting only on issues of tax administration 
in Europe, but that is a slippery slope.” 
 
Democracy and Local Control 
Although unanimous voting remains solidly in place for tax issues, several 
countries are likely to persistently oppose harmonization or changes in voting rules on 
taxes, although their reasons are divergent. On one hand Denmark as well as the other 
Scandinavian EU countries, Sweden and Finland, “are ‘high-tax, high-welfare states’ that 
want to preserve their social welfare systems” and see tax harmonization as a threat 
because they may be forced to lower their tax rates to some EU standard in the future.245   
France, though eager to support is social safety net system (a goal similar to the 
Scandinavian countries),246 views competition from low tax jurisdictions as the serious 
threat and views harmonization (of rates or bases) as desirable.  In a rather blunt 
characterization of the motives of France and Germany, a WSJ editorial paints the 
following picture: 
 
French President Jacques Chirac and departing German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder have been trying to harmonize tax rates across Europe in order to stop 
what they call ‘tax dumping,’ particularly from new East European members, 
several of which have introduced a flat tax with great success.  But tax matters fall 
under national sovereignty and harmonization would require unanimity among 
governments.  Because that is unattainable, France and Germany turned to the 
second-best option, supporting the Commission’s call for harmonizing tax bases.  
This would also require unanimity but because it’s a much more reasonable 
proposal, it might be easier to sell. . . . The problem is that it might set a 
dangerous legal precedent for eventually harmonizing tax rates as well, even 
without requiring unanimity.  That’s most likely the real reason why France and 
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10891205) (same). 
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Germany support this idea and certainly why countries rightly wary of further 
encroachment by Brussels on their sovereign rights reject it.  Among them: the 
U.K., Ireland and new members like Estonia and Slovakia.247
 
Indeed, England and Ireland have relatively low tax rates and attribute their above 
EU-average growth rates to their pro-business competitive tax plans.248  Their concern is 
that if they lose control over the rates, they may have to increase their tax rates.249  
Luxembourg is also likely to oppose harmonization, particularly that which could 
influence rates.  In the past, Luxembourg has blocked several tax measures – because it 
imposes no tax on the savings accounts of nonresidents and would lose a great deal of 
international investment if this practice were to be replaced by the European norm.250  
Thus, although seeking different endpoints, both the classically “high-tax” jurisdictions 
(e.g., the Scandinavian countries) and the classically “lower-tax” jurisdictions (e.g., 
U.K./Ireland) share a common view of tax harmonization: “the same logic would hold in 
each case – that they want to keep the right of sovereignty intact.”251   
These “national” preferences incorporate not only ideas of fiscal control – but 
fiscal control with a particular vision in mind.  To the extent that a state’s citizens highly 
value a strong welfare, the state will view fiscal control as a tool to achieve that end.  
Similarly, a state that emphasizes the government’s role in fostering an active open 
market economy conducive to trade and investment will also view fiscal control as 
valuable in producing such an economy.  The opportunity to pursue different goals, 
through and with the tax system, is one advantage offered by a multistate system.  
Moreover, the recognition that taxation is inextricably woven into national public policy 
and discourse indicates that the democratic process for translating that public will into 
action must be sufficiently transparent and responsive.  Consider the following 
observations from a member of the U.K. Treasury on this subject:  
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It’s probably true to say that there is no such thing as absolute sovereignty, 
certainly not in the modern world with not just the EU but a number of other 
supranational institutions.  There are a number of other factors that any 
government must take into account when making any kind of policy.  . . . There is 
something about the responsiveness to national preferences expressed by the 
electorate for the level of public expenditure and the taxation to fund that. . . . And 
there is also a point about accountability. 252
 
Academic examinations of the democratic qualities of the EU express specific 
reservations about the governance procedures within the EU: “The institutions [of the 
EU] have since acquired substantial and independent political power, and a new power 
center and form of governance has been established.  The new form, however, is not as 
responsive, not as accountable, not as accessible to citizen participation, and not even as 
visible as its predecessors – the national governments of the EU’s member states.  Worse, 
the more power it [the EU] gets, the more pronounced the democratic deficit 
becomes.”253  However, concerns over the democratic dimensions of an expanded grant 
of taxing power to the EU cannot definitely conclude that the EU should not pursue them 
regardless.  As the EU Tax Commissioner Laszlo Kovacs recognized, the decision to 
consolidate taxing power carries risks – the question is what benefits does it offer?:  
 
My main priority in the direct tax field, therefore, is the creation of a common 
consolidated corporate taxation base in the EU.  If companies were allowed to 
apply a single EU wide set of rules for company taxation purposes, they would 
not encounter most of the tax obstacles that they currently face when they do 
business in more than one member state. . . . Although a large number of member 
states are supportive of a common tax base, there are still a few countries opposed 
to the idea.  In some cases this opposition is based on the principle of national 
sovereignty in tax matters.  I am sympathetic to this principle, particularly in 
respect of tax rates.  But it seems to me that there are times when the prospects of 
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improved European competitiveness can outweigh purely national 
considerations.”254
 
Summary: As in the prior case of tax competition, sovereignty was used as a 
frequent refrain in critiques by a variety of commentators on EU voting rules and on the 
move toward the CCCTB.  And, once again, the “obvious” connection between 
sovereignty and taxation was presumed, although one set of comments (by a U.K. 
Treasury official) did explore the meaning of sovereignty in more detail.255  Such 
attention to the question should not be surprising because any surrender here is more 
formal given the structure of EU relations.  Explicit discussions about relations among 
member states, the EU, and sovereignty have been crucial during the creation and 
development of the EU.   
The same clamoring for fiscal control at the state level that was expressed in the 
tax competition debate appears in the comments and assessments of EU rules on taxation: 
(1) “the [CCCTB] prevents the finance minister in each member country from managing 
the economy in the ways that they feel appropriate;”256 (2) “Members states must 
maintain their sovereignty over tax issues and retain their ability to adopt policies suitable 
to their needs;”257 and (3) an important part of sovereignty is “the right to determine the 
level of expenditure and the tax rates and structures required to support it.”258  The EU 
members may have felt a heightened concern over preserving fiscal control given the 
1999 decision in the EU to harmonize monetary policy through the elimination of 
national currency and the introduction of the euro.  States offered this “loss” of monetary 
control to justify their desire to “hang on” to the fiscal control left through tax policy.259   
However, unlike the case of tax competition, the revenue aspect of the taxing 
power was important in the EU tax sovereignty debate – and each state’s view of the 
revenue question reflected its underlying assessment of the (anticipated) EU substantive 
tax policy.  The CCCTB (and more generally QMV) was undesirable for some players 
because it was viewed as a precursor to rate harmonization.260  States which perceived 
themselves to have higher than average tax rates because they sought sufficient revenue 
to support their social welfare systems (e.g., Denmark) feared a possible “forced” rate 
reduction and corresponding loss of revenue in the future.261  Conversely, states which 
perceived themselves to be “attractive” on competition grounds and which viewed efforts 
to harmonization the corporate tax base or permit QMV for taxation as likely to lead to 
harmonized higher rates feared a loss of their competitive edge.262  Thus, on the question 
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of corporate tax base harmonization, although tax sovereignty dominated the debate, the 
states’ respective views on the attractiveness of the anticipated outcome figured closely in 
their support for or rejection of the plan.   
Not only do the EU members’ differing views on the importance of higher tax 
rates and revenue influence their positions on EU tax voting rules and on harmonization, 
they exemplify some of the benefits of sovereign states discussed in Part I.  Recall that 
one identified value for sovereign states was the ability to express the local culture and 
also to respond to the will of the people.  Where different states have strongly different 
visions of the role of government and the appropriate size of government activity (e.g., 
extensive social welfare) the continued existence of many states, each able to reach an 
independent decision on these questions, enables government to more closely reflect the 
goals of its citizens.  Of course not all residents in England, France or Denmark 
necessarily share the same view of “large government,” but there is no reason to 
anticipate that moving the decision up the chain to the EU would enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of a decision that directly (or indirectly) impacted revenue and hence 
government spending.  Not only would the process suffer from the democratic deficits 
recounted extensively in the literature, but it would lack the community support (i.e. 
demos) necessary to sustain the support of the outvoted members.  Moreover, as the EU 
has grown in power, these democracy concerns have correspondingly grown.263 
Advocates for retaining tax policy control at the national level explicitly describe tax as a 
central part of sovereignty and describe democratic processes as crucial in setting tax 
policy.264  With widespread concerns about the democratic qualities of the EU, the 
reservation of tax policy (which has an explicitly sensitive connection to sovereign 
power)265  to the state level could be predicted.  One interesting twist from the EU case is 
that in an attempt to preserve tax sovereignty by declining to pursue certain harmonizing 
actions at the EU-wide level, the member states have effectively ceded the decision-
making floor to the European Court of Justice, at least in a negative way (i.e. the court 
can strike down domestic legislation, but not enact replacements). 266  
 
 
C. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE FSC/ETI CONTROVERSY    
The third case study examines the sovereignty arguments that have arisen in the 
active debate and furor over the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) rulings against the 
United States and its Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) regime and its Extraterritorial 
Income (ETI) regime.  The controversy originated in the U.S. enactment of the FSC 
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regime in 1984.267  The regime essentially provided an exemption from U.S. income 
taxation for certain export sales income earned by a foreign (sales) subsidiary of a U.S. 
manufacturer. The treatment was elective and required the FSC itself to meet a number of 
requirements.  The United States considered the FSC regime a necessary step to provide a 
“level playing field” for U.S. exporters who would be competing against foreign 
companies whose own domestic tax systems levied a combination of consumption taxes 
and territorial income taxes.  Why would the U.S. exporters be at a disadvantage?  The 
view was that foreign exporters (e.g., from the European Union) bear effectively no 
domestic tax on their active export sales income: (1) their consumption tax system (a 
valued added tax—VAT) excludes exported goods because the consumption will take 
place outside the domestic jurisdiction, and (2) their income tax system operates on a 
“territorial” basis, meaning that active business income earned outside the domestic 
jurisdiction is not subject to tax (in contrast, at least formally, U.S. corporations are 
subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income).  The combination was considered 
to provide an advantage to foreign exporters over U.S. exporters.268
In response to the enactment of the FSC rules, the EU brought a challenge to these 
provisions to the WTO in November 1997 [more than a decade after their enactment].269  
After unsuccessful dispute resolution attempts, a WTO panel issued a report concluding 
that the FSC provisions violated WTO rules.  The United States appealed the decision 
and in February 2000, the WTO appellate body ruled against the United States.  Thus, in 
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November 2000 the United States repealed the FSC legislation, and replaced it with the 
ETI provisions which the U.S. viewed as meeting the WTO requirements while providing 
some competitive support to U.S. exporters.270  Under the ETI rules, certain foreign sales 
and leasing income was excluded from U.S. income tax regardless of where the property 
was manufactured so long as specified activities related to solicitation and negotiation of 
sales occurred outside the United States.  Application of the ETI rules required no 
election, nor the formation of a special corporation.271
Almost immediately following the enactment of the ETI regime the EU brought a 
challenge in the WTO, and in August 2001, a WTO panel found that the ETI regime, like 
its predecessor the FSC, violated WTO rules.  Again the United States appealed, and the 
WTO Appellate Body, in a report adopted in January 2002, affirmed the panel’s 
determination against the ETI regime (although it did narrow and limit some of the 
panel’s far reaching language).272  In October 2004, the U.S. Congress passed the Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, which repealed the ETI regime but included transitional relief.273  
In January 2005, the “European Communities” again brought the issue to the WTO.274  
The resulting panel’s report in August 2005 concluded that the repeal of ETI in the Jobs 
Act was insufficient to comply with the WTO’s prior rulings, given the nature of the 
transitional relief: The “Jobs Act maintains prohibited FSC and ETI subsidies through the 
transition and grandfathering measures at issue, it continues to fail to implement fully the 
operative . . . recommendations and rulings to withdraw the prohibited subsidies and to 
bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the relevant covered 
agreements.”275  The WTO Appellate body upheld the panel’s findings in its February 
2006 report.276
During  a portion of this FSC/ETI dispute the EU had imposed trade sanctions.  
“[F]rom March 2004 to January 2005 [the sanctions] started out at 5 percent of the WTO-
authorized amounts of US $4 billion and rose 1 percentage point monthly to 14 percent.  
They mainly targeted U.S. precious stones and jewelry, machinery and mechanical 
appliances, wood and paper articles, leather articles, and toys and sports equipment.”277  
The EU had, following the 2006 WTO ruling in its favor, indicated that sanctions would 
resume on May 16, 2006, but a May 9, 2006 Congressional agreement on a tax bill278  
resolving the FSC/ETI issued forestalled implementation of the sanctions.279  One of the 
acknowledged difficulties in repealing the ETI regime was the reality that the repeal 
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would create winners and losers among domestic corporations, given the inability to 
replicate the effects of ETI.280
Not surprisingly, the U.S. reaction to the WTO dispute was not favorable – and 
this third case study sharpens the focus on the final sovereignty scenario – a state 
challenging on sovereignty grounds the actions of an international body to which its has 
already surrendered certain taxing powers.  The United States contended that the WTO’s 
analyses and decisions were flawed on a variety of grounds.  However, one significant 
objection was that the WTO’s position violated U.S. tax sovereignty because it 
effectively sought to force the United States to abandon its tax system in favor other 
another. [Recall that the U.S. income tax is imposed on a worldwide basis, whereas other 
countries’ tax systems do not typically reach income earned outside that country.  Given 
this situation, U.S. exporters arguably faced a higher tax burden than their foreign 
competitors.  The relief provided by the U.S. (in the form of the FSC and ETI) had been 
rejected, leaving a more fundamental shift to territorial taxation as the “only” way to 
provide a level playing field for U.S. exporters.].  A range of governmental officials, tax 
commentators, and taxpayer advocates criticized the WTO outcome on sovereignty 





 As with the first two case studies, commentators considered taxing powers as central 
to the state’s authority and as a crucial element in designing and controlling fiscal policy: 
 
(1) Rep. Gil Gutknecht: “Sovereignty:  Another problem is that we are being forced 
to change our U.S. laws to comply with these free trade agreements.  Does anyone 
remember just a few months ago, we had to change our corporate FSC-ETI laws 
to comply with a ruling made against the United States by the World Trade 
Organization?”281 
 
(2) Sen. Bob Graham: [In context of extensive testimony and questions on a very 
broad range of trade topics including FSC/ETI, the following comment was made] 
“Sen. Bob. Graham (D-FL): Mr. Zoellick, thank you very much for your always 
thoughtful comments.  I’d like to start with a comment and then go to a question.  
And my comment goes to the issue that you have just been discussing with 
Senator Snowe.  In my opinion, in a number of areas, the United States is losing 
its national sovereignty.”282 
 
(3) Philip West, former International Tax Counsel for the U.S. Treasury: “If we lose 
the FSC and ETI cases. . . there’s going to be a request that we change our law, 
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and [that] will ruffle those who feel this is an affront to our sovereignty. . . I’m not 
sure there’s an easy way out for policymakers.”283 
 
(4) Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Treasury: “Few things 
are as central to a country’s sovereignty as the right to choose its own tax system.  
The ETI provisions, like the FSC provisions that preceded them, represent an 
integral part of our larger system of international tax rules.  These provisions were 
designed to help level the playing field for U.S.-based businesses that are subject 
to those international tax rules.  As we contemplate our next steps, we should not 
lose sight of that.”284 
 
(5) Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Treasury: “[T[his case 
highlights significant issues requiring further consideration as the discussion 
regarding the WTO matters continue in the new round.  As I said in my opening 
statement in the WTO appellate proceedings in this case in Geneva last 
November, ‘few things are as central to a country’s sovereignty as how it raises 
revenue.’  The WTO Appellate Body in its report in the FSC case state that the 
WTO rules do not ‘compel Members to choose a particular kind of tax system.’  
That is a critically important point.  Compliance with the WTO decision in this 
case will require that we make meaningful changes to our tax law.”285 
 
Democratic Legitimacy 
Being on the losing end of a multinational institution’s tax policy decisions quickly 
unleashes objections to the institution’s ability to legitimately represent its members and 
to impose its will.  Criticisms of the WTO following the FSC/ETI decisions emphasize 
broader democratic objections as well as targeted challenges: 
 
(1) Claude Barfield: “National Sovereignty and the Reach of WTO Rules into 
Domestic Policy.  The FSC/ETI decisions raise troubling questions about the 
reach of multilateral trading rules versus the right of national government to 
determine fundamental tax policy.  Because these decisions cannot be overturned 
short of a unanimous agreement by WTO member states, they also highlight a 
major constitutional flaw in the WTO that already is operating in this and other 
cases to undermine its legitimacy.”286 
 
(2) Richard Reinhold: “An interesting feature of the GATT is its dispute resolution 
mechanism under which a government claiming a violation of its rights is entitled 
to the establishment of an impartial panel with the power to deliver final and 
binding decisions.  The mechanism has drawn criticism in the context of the 
debate over the so-called ‘ETI’ tax regime.  ETI proponents argue that the GATT 
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override was unconstitutional, (1) under Article III of the Constitution . . . . and 
(4) based on a so-called ‘sovereignty argument.’”287  
 
“The sovereignty argument stems from the fact that a WTO Member State will 
not be able to block consensus adoption of a dispute report under the dispute 
resolution mechanism adopted during the Uruguay round.”288  
 
(3) Daniel Mitchell: “The World Trade Organization (WTO) has ruled that portions 
of the U.S. tax law – specifically, the Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial 
Income (FSC/ETI) Act – provide an impermissible ‘export subsidy.’. . . The bad 
news is that the WTO is interfering with America’s fiscal sovereignty by insisting 
that Congress repeal the FSC/ETI legislation or run the risk of more than $4 
billion of compensatory tariffs on U.S. exports to the European Union nations.”289
 
“The European Union also is interfering with U.S. tax policy by asking the World 
Trade Organization to rule that provisions of our tax code, such as the foreign 
sales corporation (FSC) regime are impermissible. . . . International tax 
harmonization schemes would mean pervasive erosion of U.S. fiscal 
sovereignty.”290
 
(4)  Duncan Bentley: “The irony is that modern international groupings designed to 
preserve sovereignty and further individual nations’ aspirations have their greatest 
effect when they intrude on the sovereignty of their members. . . Yet that 
sovereignty is increasingly limited by binding agreements at the supranational 
level.”291  
 
“[After describing the history of the WTO rulings on the FSC and ETI legislation] 
he observes that “[P.B.] Stephen suggests that [the FSC/ETI events] are an 
example of the WTO constraining U.S. tax policy.”292
 
(5) Paul McDaniel: “In this Section, I first address the question whether the FSC/ETI 
decisions constitute an unacceptable intrusion into U.S. sovereignty. . . . 
Certainly, few problems touch more sensitive sovereignty issues than taxation.  
Probably every country – certainly the United States – views its fiscal system as 
sacrosanct from invasion by other nations or international bodies. . . .If there is an 
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invasion of U.S. sovereignty by the WTO rules and procedures, it is one to which 
our elected representatives have agreed.”293
 
 Summary: Once again, sovereignty serves as “universal” rhetoric for why a 
nation’s loss of control over tax policy is considered problematic.  Some of the comments 
even specifically reiterated the importance of taxation to the sovereign state, including 
International Tax Counsel Angus’s statement: “Few things are as central to a country’s 
sovereignty as the right to choose its own tax system.”294  Similarly, the functional 
concerns of revenue (e.g., “few things are as central to a country’s sovereignty as how it 
raises revenue”295) and fiscal policy more generally (e.g., “The U.S., after all, fiercely 
guards its fiscal sovereignty;”296   “The bad news is that the WTO is interfering with 
America’s fiscal sovereignty; ”297 and “United States  -- views its fiscal system as 
sacrosanct from invasion”298) were cited as an elaboration of the harm suffered when the 
U.S. was forced to cede control over part of its tax system. 
 Democracy issues played an important role in the debate over the WTO and its 
handling of the FSC/ETI complaint.  A number of statements reflected reservations about 
and criticisms of the legitimacy of WTO procedures.  Unlike the analysis in the context 
of the EU, the comments were not concerned with the representation of the people (here, 
of the United States) through the actions of the supra-national body, but instead with the 
representation of the nation in that body.  The difference likely arises from the distinct 
roles of the EU and the WTO.  The EU, although not susceptible to a single label, seems 
more akin to a federal body with possible aspirations of superseding the member states.  
A body that could potentially take much or all of the place of the nation-state, must 
carefully consider its relationship to individual citizens.  In contrast, the WTO is an 
organization of states which have agreed to certain terms and dispute resolution 
mechanisms regarding trade, and owes its responsibility to the signing states. 
 The unanimous voting provisions in the WTO generated some of the legitimacy 
concerns (“Because these decisions [of the WTO body] cannot be overturned short of a 
unanimous agreement by WTO member states, they also highlight a major constitutional 
flaw in the WTO that already is operating in this and other cases to undermine its 
legitimacy;”299 and “The sovereignty argument stems from the fact that a WTO Member 
State will not be able to block consensus adoption of a dispute report under the dispute 
resolution mechanism [of the WTO]”300).  The distinction between the debate about 
FSC/ETI and the debate in the EU case was again sharpened by McDaniel’s observation 
that if there is any sovereignty problem with the “WTO rules and procedures, it is one to 
which our elected representatives have agreed.”301  Unlike the tax sovereignty debate in 
the EU which was primarily forward looking and questioned the desirability of ceding of 
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any significant state taxing powers to the EU, the disagreement in the FSC/ETI case 
concerned displeasure with the functioning of a process to which the United States had 
formally committed.   
An interesting overview by Bentley captured the pervasive tension faced by 
nations today as they contemplate whether to solve their global problems through global 
solutions (and institutions) despite the likelihood (and virtual necessity) of surrendering 
some significant sovereignty in the process: “The irony is that modern international 
groupings designed to preserve sovereignty and further individual nation’s aspirations 
have their greatest effect when they intrude on the sovereignty of their members.”302  Is 
that trade off best characterized as a loss of sovereignty, or as the use of an international 
institution to enhance a single state’s capacity to achieve its goals?  The FSC/ETI case 
study suggests that the answer may depend in part on satisfaction with the outcomes. 
 
III.   SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY   
  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY THEORY 
This article directs attention primarily at the question of the relationship between 
sovereignty and international tax and makes several arguments: (1) A loss of tax 
sovereignty can undermine both significant functional roles played by a nation-state 
(revenue and fiscal policy) and important normative governance values (accountability 
and democratic legitimacy); (2) sovereignty rhetoric, though capable of being misused 
and of obscuring critical issues, nonetheless provides a valuable signaling benefit; (3) 
sovereignty language in the debates surrounding the three case studies draws upon these 
sovereignty values and benefits; and (4) no satisfactory method for balancing competing 
claims of tax sovereignty has been articulated, although inter-nation equity has implicitly 
formed the basis of at least one claim.  The tax case studies, however, have  implications 
for sovereignty theory more generally and this subsection highlights three major points: 
(1) the role of nonstate actors, (2) the importance of domestic conflict, and (3) democracy 
dimensions of sovereignty. 
 
 1. NONSTATE ACTORS AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 
Traditionally sovereignty concerned the relations between states or potential 
states.  In the past century, though, sovereignty has focused increasingly on the 
relationship between states and nonstate actors (typically international organizations) and 
the sovereignty implications of their cooperation.303  All three case studies in Part II 
exemplify the importance of international organizations in creating the framework for the 
very cooperation that could undermine state sovereignty.  Although states remain the 
actual actors (their tax systems and rules are in dispute), international organizations play 
a mediating role (important distinctions among those roles are considered below in Part 
III.A.3).  States favoring enhanced cooperation on some issue (e.g., tax competition or 
CCCTB) work through a relevant organization to establish a structure or approach for 
cooperation.  States challenging the cooperation as an infringement of their tax 
sovereignty direct these critiques not only at the other states, but also at the organization 
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itself for facilitating the infringement.  One unique dimension of the EU case is the fact 
that the potential cooperation could be characterized not as a usurpation of state 
sovereignty by an international organization, but rather as the gradual move from many 
smaller European states to one European mega-state.  Seen through that lens, the 
international organization (i.e. the EU) is not an interloper undermining the sovereignty 
dynamics among nations, but instead the precursor of a new state that too will vigorously 
defend its sovereignty rights.304
Potential differences between the EU and the OECD as they relate to sovereignty 
also appear in the context of the “new sovereignty” idea that sovereignty is better 
understood as not just rights but also duties.  The claim, for example, is that in the United 
Nations, “membership” is not simply a validation of state sovereignty, but also an 
obligation to meet certain duties.  This more interactive understanding of sovereignty can 
make sense for members of the international organization.  However, when an 
organization like the OECD directs some activities toward non-members305 (e.g., the tax 
competition plan), the effect might be better described as a clash between two groups of 
states on sovereignty grounds.  The fact that one group has organized its exercise of 
sovereignty through some shared decision in an international organization does not 
change the sovereignty conflict.  The other group of states will maintain that they have no 
connection to the organization and no duty to follow its proposals.  They will claim their 
sovereignty independent of and unrelated to the activities of the organization.  
Regardless of distinctions between the EU and the OECD, their roles in tax 
cooperation constitute examples of the modern view of sovereignty, which holds that 
international organizations do not undermine states.  Instead, state sovereignty is 
preserved by relying on a new tool (international organizations) to help the state respond 
to global forces.306  For example, the OECD tax competition plan was defended on the 
grounds that given the nature of modern finance, commerce and communications, 
individual states would have a difficult time enforcing their own domestic tax laws and 
preventing “harmful” tax competition.  Certainly from these states’ perspective, OECD-
organized cooperation enhanced their sovereign right to implement their own tax 
systems.  Similarly, the EU’s proposed CCCTB effectively asks the member states to 
consider relinquishing some direct control over setting the corporate tax base in return for 
reducing transaction costs that have escalated with the increase in cross-border 
operations.  Given that states seek to facilitate investment and commercial activity with 
their tax rules, cooperating on the corporate tax base is more effective than clinging to tax 
sovereignty.  What looks like the surrender of sovereignty could ultimately enhance the 
states’ ability to achieve its primary tax system goals. 
 
2. DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS 
Typically discussions of state sovereignty envision the state as a single actor, 
seeking to preserve its sovereign power against both grasping international organizations 
and against other states.  This focus on the state is not unique to sovereignty; much of IR 
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theory directs its attention to state actors, and treats them as monolithic entities.  The tax 
competition case study and the FSC/ETI case study, however, highlight the importance of 
one trend in IR theory of the past several decades–recognizing the global effects of 
domestic politics.   
As the U.S. side of the tax competition story reveals, even on sovereignty 
questions nations do not have monolithic positions.  The U.S. administration in place 
during the late 1990s actively participated in and supported the OECD work on harmful 
tax competition.  In their calculus, this involvement posed no sovereignty problem for the 
United States.  Instead, it offered an opportunity for the United States to shore up 
enforcement of its own tax laws.  The next administration (2001), however, was receptive 
to the claims of groups such as the CFP that the United States would be harmed by the 
OECD plan and that it would infringe upon our tax sovereignty.  Even though the new 
administration ultimately took a position on the OECD plan that was less hostile than 
initially voiced in 2001,307 there nonetheless was a marked shift in U.S. position which 
reflected the shift in political power in the United States.  It would not be possible to 
appreciate (or predict) the U.S. stance without examining the domestic conflict on these 
issues.  Similarly, the FSC/ETI conflict included an imbedded domestic debate between 
U.S. manufacturers which benefitted from the ETI provisions and those which did not.  
Although, there was general resistance in the United States to the WTO’s rulings, there 
was significant disagreement over the best U.S. response.  As the case study indicated, 
the repeal of ETI would inherently create domestic winners and losers among taxpayers 
because the repeal could not fully replicate the ETI’s effects.  These tensions contributed 
to the difficulty that Congress experienced in trying to comply with the WTO’s rulings.   
To the extent many countries utilize some form of democratic government, 
changes in national policy (at least to some degree) are likely as political parties gain and 
lose power within the government.  Although a broad national consensus might exist on 
vague questions of sovereignty, the more concrete the questions of international 
cooperation become, the more likely the state does not have internal agreement, despite 
the fact it must speak on the international stage with a single voice. 
 
3. DEMOCRACY DIMENSIONS OF COOPERATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 
The three case studies, with their distinct scenarios, demonstrate that sovereignty 
fears arise at three important stages in a nation state’s efforts to interact with other states 
on issues beyond the national sphere.  In the first stage, represented by the tax 
competition debate, two countries (or groups of countries) each defend their tax practices 
and plans on the grounds of tax sovereignty and the right of nations to control fiscal 
policy.  Essentially this is what the OECD nations and the haven nations were doing, 
despite finding it advantageous to avoid this characterization.  Is this description 
undermined by the fact that one of the groups was acting through the OECD?  No -- the 
conflict was not (at least until the CFP tried to frame it this way) a debate between OECD 
members, but instead a debate between some nations who developed their position with 
the assistance of an organization and another group of states.  The clash of sovereignty 
claims lacked obvious resolution because, as discussed earlier, no clear priority of 
sovereignty arguments has been established. 
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In the second stage, represented by the EU case study, the conflict concerns 
whether a nation-state should surrender to a supra-state body (the EU) its tax sovereignty 
on a significant array of tax questions.  Here, prioritizing of sovereignty claims is not 
critical, rather, the question is how to weigh the loss of sovereignty with the benefits of 
coordinated action on tax policy matters that reach beyond the single state.  Central to 
this debate is accurately assessing the harm from loss of sovereignty—including the 
accountability and legitimacy risks to the EU democratic processes. The inquiry extends 
beyond a formalistic assessment of the procedural picture in the EU to ask the more 
elusive question of whether the EU as a community is ready to act as one on such 
matters–whether there is an adequate demos, or sense of shared commitment to sustain 
the “losing” members.  The controversy over the CCCTB and its implications for tax 
rates and revenue suggest that there is a wide divergence of opinion on desired policy, 
and that states continue to view their divergence as reflective of their national character. 
In the third stage, represented by the FSC/ETI debate, the nation-state has already 
surrendered some sovereignty to an international organization (here the WTO, through 
agreement).  The controversy arises when the international organization then uses some 
of that transferred power to make binding decisions.  When the losing state disagrees, it 
might object on the grounds of sovereignty as did the United States – but what does that 
mean?  One possibility is the organization exceeded its grant of power from the states – 
in which case, we might be in a position more similar to the tax competition case study.  
Alternatively, the sovereignty claims might reflect a sense that the organization’s process 
was not “legitimate” – or more generally, that the losing state did not have faith in the 
“community” to produce a fair, even though arguably wrong, decision.  Unless the United 
States’ sovereignty claims fall into the first camp, it not clear what to make of its buyer’s 
remorse.  There are important reasons, as explored in Part I, to question the transfer of 
power to an international body, but those are questions that should be examined in 
advance.  Presumably when the United States joined the WTO, the balance tilted in favor 
of surrendering some sovereign powers.  But given the inherent accountability, 
legitimacy and demos problems with international organizations, it should have been no 
surprise if and when these problems surfaced, much to the displeasure of the losing state. 
The FSC/ETI case study raises an additional question about the decision to 
surrender some powers—does it matter what form the surrender takes and what exit 
strategy exists?  The EU and the WTO are very different international bodies in terms of 
their relationship to the member states and the relations among the member states.  As 
reiterated a number of times, the EU cannot be readily classified, but it is more likely to 
approach “super-state” status than the WTO, which is granted a limited amount of 
authority to enforce a set of agreed upon rules in trade.  Should we think about surrender 
of sovereignty differently in each case?  Is one a more desirable format for joining 
together to solve global problems?  Alternatively, what about an organization such as the 
OECD which lacks the authority to bind its members?  Certainly these are questions 
which merit extensive investigation.  However, a few observations can be made based on 
the sovereignty analysis. 
First, no single organizational form is likely to be superior because they each 
serve different needs and make sense for different communities of states.  The degree of 
sovereignty transferred in the EU seems implausible for a group of countries without the 
level of community and commitment that the European nations exhibit.  Conversely, the 
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OECD can explore a range of issues with some increased flexibility because its positions 
are not binding (consider for example that although the OECD has a Model Income Tax 
Treaty, the United States, which is an OECD member, has its own model as well. 
Second, within an organization changes can be made to accommodate sovereignty 
concerns (e.g., accountability and legitimacy) for different issues.  The experience of the 
EU with a range of complex voting rules suggests that this type of flexibility allows a 
single organization to expand its umbrella. Though centralization of decision-making 
inherently reduces local variation and increases the layers between the people and the 
decisions, the upside is the ability to resolve supranational problems.  The EU example 
and the formulation of QMV (with multiple requirements) demonstrate the possibility of 
creatively designing the structure to maximize its legitimacy. 
Third, an important dimension of the international organization’s “form” is the 
exit strategy it makes available to states.  To the extent a state objects, either on a specific 
matter, or more universally, is exit from the organization possible?  Is it at all realistic?  
The United States may challenge the WTO but it is a more serious step to fail to comply.  
That said, funding issues and subsequent treaty rounds provide opportunities to either 
retreat or express dissatisfaction.  Certainly, the more readily a state can exit from a 
decision or an organization, the weaker the organizational power. 
Finally, organizations also interact with each other in addressing international 
problems.  For example, the EU, which can establish a “uniform” voice for the European 
countries, can interact with the OECD, which represents a different scale and nature of 
membership.  A number of international organizations, cognizant of their increasing role 
and increasing responsibilities in international tax, formed the International Tax Dialogue 
– a “collaborative arrangement involving the IDB,308 IMF,309 OECD, UN and World 
Bank Group to encourage and facilitate discussion of tax matters among national tax 
officials, international organisations, and a range of other key stakeholders.”310  One 
possible effect is that a multiplicity of international organizations with overlapping 
membership could decrease sovereignty fears vis a vis any particular organization. 
 
B. THE FUTURE 
What should we make of the swirl of sovereignty debate surrounding tax issues?  
One way to contemplate the relationship between sovereignty and international tax is to 
imagine two scenarios and consider the reactions of various states.  First, what if the EU 
were to invite the United States to join the EU on tax policy (perhaps on a level similar to 
Norway which is not a member, or perhaps even more fully)?  What sovereignty 
arguments would be raised against the idea?  Would they be stronger than those 
generated against the OECD tax competition plan?  Second, what if the U.S. and the EU 
were to consider joint rate setting and collection of income (with spending decisions to 
remain at the national level)?  By all accounts this would seem to constitute a clear 
sovereignty problem, even among those commentators who found sovereignty fears 
exaggerated in other settings.  How could such a step be reconciled with a system based 
on sovereign states?  Are there ways that the collaboration could be structured to satisfy 
these concerns?  More generally, would moving to this system seriously threaten the  
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“system” of sovereign states, or merely infringe upon a traditional state power?  Even 
though we are unlikely to see either of these events soon, exploration of such questions 
helps push our understanding of the meaning of sovereignty in international tax. 
The prognosis for the future of tax cooperation seems uncertain.  Tax policy 
broadly raises two very contentious issues – the size of government and the allocation of 
tax burdens (redistribution).  Both of these are very “political” as opposed to technical 
questions, and require the support of the populace more than the assistance of experts.  
Given the difficulty in reaching agreement in the United States on these questions, it is 
hard to imagine substantial reconciliation among nations.  Nonetheless, there remain a 
multitude of tax problems that are more technical in nature which can benefit from 
international cooperation.  However, the closer these questions come to affecting total 




 The evolving meaning of sovereignty, with its increased focus on the state’s 
responsibility for its citizens, is reflected in international tax arguments for sovereignty. 
The close link between taxing powers and the ability of the state to fulfill its obligations 
to its citizens explains why states articulate sovereignty as a defense to certain 
international tax overtures.  Although, sovereignty can serve as rhetorical camouflage for 
unprincipled points, it can also highlight the need to protect certain decision-making 
powers that the state considers its prerogative.  The cooperation and harmonization plans 
under consideration today in the OECD and the EU are not likely to impact the existence 
of, nor the stability of, the state-based political system.  However, on a case-by-case 
basis, with potential cumulative effects, it is not unreasonable for states to raise 
sovereignty objections.  In a world in which being a sovereign state is a valuable and 
important classification, states should ask whether a particular decision will compromise 
sovereignty – and for what benefit?  In the case of taxation, the sovereignty costs may 
implicate the surrender of decisions intimately linked to the local, democratic, political 
process. Of course, cooperation itself may be the key to preserving sovereignty – the 
question is whether all states can be persuaded to believe. 
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